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THE FUTURE OF TELEMEDICINE & ITS
FAUSTIAN RELIANCE ON
REGULATORY TRADE BARRIERS FOR
PROTECTION
Thomas R. McLeant
INTRODUCTION
Telemedicine is revolutionizing the practice of medicine. Digitali-
zation of medical data in virtually every medical discipline, coupled
with recent advancements in telecommunications, means that physi-
cians are no longer required to reside on the same continent as their
patients.' High-tech telemedical systems have already allowed provid-
ers in India to capture 2 percent of the U.S. health care market.2 Thus,
in 2003, $340 million moved from the United States to India to cover
just the cost of outsourced medical transcription and billing.3 This
dollar value for trade-in-telemedical services would be substantially
higher if it were possible to get a handle on the teleradiology market.4
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See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine:
Scope, Economic Issues, and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205 (2005). See
also Mehran Anvari, Remote Telepresence Surgery, 4 LAPAROscOpY TODAY 5, 5-7
(2005) (experience with non-physician astronauts suggest that telemedicine supervi-
sion of physician extenders may allow the latter to perform surgical procedures
thereby eliminating the need for local physicians).
2 WORLD HEALTH ORG: INDIA OFFICE, NEW DELHI, COUNTRY REPORT FOR
MODE 1: CRoss-BORDER TRADE IN HEALTH SERVICES - (E-HEALTH): INDIA -
COUNTRY LEVEL REPORT 65 (July 2003), available at http://www.whoindia.org/
en/section2/section233_538.htm [hereinafter WHO INDIA REPORT] (draft working
paper).
' Id. at 64.
4 Presently, it does not appear that reliable estimates for the size of the tel-
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Moreover, given the size of the U.S. health care market, it is not a
surprise that India believes its use of telemedicine has only tapped
into the "tip of the e-health iceberg" of the trade-in-medical-
services5-an iceberg that appears to only enlarge as corporate Amer-
ica searches for a way to tap into a low-wage labor pool of providers
to hold down health and pension expenses. 6 In short, the stage has
been set for America to offshore many of its medical provider posi-
tions.7 But for medical providers whose jobs may vanish, just like the
jobs of the blue collar workers in the 1970s and the white collar work-
ers in the early 1990s, the question now becomes: How do we as a
nation protect our medical jobs from being moved offshore?
While several methods exist to limit market access8 and thereby
protect a market from competition, the preferred method of protecting
the U.S. health care market from foreign providers is the erection of
trade barriers, i.e., "regulations and measures imposed by [govern-
mental agencies] that unduly impede trade in goods or services, in
export or import."9 Unfortunately, in an era of global trade, when a
country uses a trade barrier, that country does little more than buy
eradiology market exist. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that teleradiology, and
more generally telemedicine, is currently being provided primarily by a small number
of private companies and not-for-profit organizations that do not have a duty to file
public reports.
5 WHO INDIA REPORT, supra note 2, at 63. As the cost of telecommunica-
tions time falls, the volume of medicine practiced in cyberspace is expected to stead-
ily rise. See Ronald C. Merrell, Telemedicine and Telesurgery in the Operating Room,
90 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 8, 9-13 (2005). America Online Inc.'s entry into the tele-
medical market will cause costs to fall faster. See AOL to Start VOIP Service, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C3 (providing AOL's plan to roll out voice over Internet
protocol (VOIP) services).
6 McLean, supra note 1, at 215. Partially due to medical expenses, the cor-
porate bonds of some of America's stalwart manufacturers have been degraded to
junk bond status. Rick Popely, GM, Ford Bonds Are Driven to Junk Yard: S&P Low-
ers Rating in Latest Blow to Icons, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 2005, at Cl. As a result of this
degradation, corporate America appears to have become almost desperate to control
medical expenses. Greg Burns, Health-care Costs Targeted as Cure for Corporate
Ills: As Medical Expenses Soar, More Companies Are Seeking to Shift Burden to
Individuals, CHw. TRIB., May 7, 2005, at C 1.
7 McLean, supra note 1, at 215 (discussing in detail the rationale for the
potential outsourcing of virtually all professional medical positions).
8 For instance, market access could be limited because of the capital costs
required to enter the market, knowledge monopolies, sustained disruption of transpor-
tation or communication networks, and through the implementation of regulations
that raise transaction costs to prohibitive levels.
9 Ministry of Trade & Indus., What are Barriers to Trade?, http://192.49.
226.41/ktm/kaupaneste/ekaupaneste.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). More gener-
ally, a trade barrier is any device used by a government to impede the establishment
of a new industry. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 308 (1947).
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itself some time because the competition in international trade quickly
learns to neutralize trade barriers.'° Accordingly, when a country pro-
tects a market with a trade barrier, those in that market must accept
that they have entered into a Faustian deal. That is, just as in Goethe's
classic tale, Dr. Faustus learns after several years of youth and pros-
perity that the devil must be paid, so too must health care providers
realize that after a number of years of domestic telemedicine prosper-
ity due to trade barriers, other nations will have to be paid. These two
situations differ primarily in the method of payment: Goethe's story
concerns a transaction in souls, whereas telemedicine concerns trans-
actions in money and jobs.
Yet, there is more to the story of the globalization of medicine: in-
ternational trade treaties. While most in the health care sector have
never contemplated international trade treaties, the time has come for
health care providers to familiarize themselves with the basic concepts
of international law. Not only does telemedicine raise international
trade concerns, but international trade treaties are also likely to impact
state licensure and insurance requirements. In fact, because trade bar-
riers in the form of state licensure and insurance requirements are the
fundamental method by which the United States protects its domestic
telemedical market from low-wage foreign providers, international
trade treaties have the potential to fundamentally alter the way medi-
cine is practiced.
Accordingly, this article examines the coming age of international
telemedicine. It seeks to stimulate discussion on this subject rather
than to be a comprehensive or definitive policy paper. Part I provides
an overview of the operational nuts and bolts of a telemedical practice
to demonstrate that the financial barriers are minimal to enter the
telemedicine marketplace. Part II takes a detailed look at the regula-
tory trade barriers that are the principle means by which U.S. tele-
medical providers seek to protect their market from foreign competi-
tion. For multiple reasons, including multilateral international trade
agreements, the ability of trade barriers to protect the domestic tele-
10 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 33, 169, 358-
60 (1999) (defining "globalization" as the current international system integrating the
world); Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade and Competition
Laws Work Together in the International Marketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 343,
343 (2001-2002) (trade barriers represent an antiquated notion that encourages
"gamesmanship in the international trading arena"); and Marc S. Ehrlich, Comment,
Towards a New Dialogue Between International Relations Theory and International
Trade Theory, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 259, 265 (1997-1998) (today free
trade, and not trade barriers "provide the richest benefits and highest efficiency in a
self-regulating global marketplace").
2006)
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medical market will decline with time. Next, Part III examines the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)" and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 12 to illustrate how multi-
lateral international trade agreements will likely impact the telemedi-
cal market.13 In particular, the discussion will focus on how multilat-
eral international trade agreements will act to weaken the state laws
that serve as trade barriers. Finally, Part IV looks at the future of
telemedicine as we move into a world of global trade in telemedicine.
For the United States, this will mean that the national medical licen-
sure will likely supplant the existing state licensure system for multi-
ple reasons, including America's desire to purchase health care ser-
vices from low-wage providers abroad, as it seems we can no longer
afford to purchase health care from U.S. providers. 14 In conclusion,
this article observes that while the erection of trade barriers to protect
the U.S. domestic telemedical market may be prudent today, we must
look for more durable solutions to protect our domestic telemedicine
market if America is to retain its hegemonic position in health care.
I. TELEMEDICINE TODAY
A. Technology: All Systems Are Go
Technology is no longer a barrier to entering the telemedicine
marketplace. Historically, as the videophone demonstrates, bringing
technology to market can be a significant barrier to trade. Although a
prototype videophone was demonstrated at the New York World Fair
in 1964, it was not until 1993 that the videophone was brought to the
market.' 5 But today we are long past the lag phase associated with
11 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
12 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
13 GATS and NAFTA are not the only international agreements that have
potential impact on telemedicine. Discussion of these trade agreements that impact
medicine (including the World Trade Organization's Trade Related Intellectual Prop-
erty and Services, and the recently enacted Central American Free Trade Agreement)
is beyond the scope of this article.
14 McLean, supra note 1, at 225; Thomas R. McLean, Medical Rationing:
The Implicit Result of Leadership by Example, 36 J. HEALTH L. 325, 334-35 (2003)
(examining the impact on the quality of government health care purchasing and se-
lecting overseas providers as a potential solution).
15 BD. ON ScI., TECH. & ECON. POLICY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
INTERNATIONAL FRICTION AND COOPERATION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
AND TRADE: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 177 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 1997) (analyz-
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telemedical technologic development, be it videoconferencing be-
tween physicians or remote robotic surgery, as such technology is
readily available for purchase. Yet, the real question for anyone con-
templating entering the business of telemedicine is whether the tech-
nology is affordable.
The answer to this question is yes. The capital outlay required to
enter the business of telemedicine today is, at worst, modest.16 Hard-
ware requirements are limited to the purchase of computers and access
to a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 17 Today, Pentium Four com-
puters, which sell for under $1,000, have sufficient speed and graphi-
cal revolution to support most, if not all, telemedical application pro-
grams. 18 How many computers are needed to be purchased up front
depends on the volume of telemedical services a company is planning
on providing. Conceptually, the purchase of a single Pentium Four
computer, with a plan to purchase more computers as business cash
flow improves, is all that is needed to enter the telemedical business.
Capital must also be available for securing a VPN, which is a "fast,
secure and reliable communications . . ." connection between the pro-
vider and the remote location.' 9 More specifically, VPNs are com-
posed of a high-speed telecommunication connection (a T1 line or
better) that remains dedicated while data is transmitted over a specific
set of routers; i.e., telecommunication switches.20 VPN access, which
can be purchased from a telephone company or an Internet Service
Provider, has variable initial hook-up charges that can run anywhere
ing, through differing international views, the effect of policy on technology). In part,
this time lag from prototype to market is complicated by the tax code, which dictates
how existing equipment is depreciated. Id. Various existing telephone switching
mechanisms in 1964 required depreciation over twenty years, thus rendering the
introduction of a new technology not cost-effective. Id. at 177-78.
16 Conceptually, telemedicine contemplates a wide variety of services; from
teleconsultations to cybersurgery. To simplify the discussion of this article wherever
possible, examples of technology and cost are taken from the field of teleradiology.
The selection of teleradiology over other telemedical services for example, was cho-
sen for two reasons. First, teleradiology is the largest component of international
telemedicine today. Second, in terms of complexity, and hence cost, teleradiology is
roughly midway between teleconsultations and cybersurgery.
17 E-mail from Jafar Amini, MD, Chief of the Radiology Section, Leaven-
worth VAMC, to Thomas R. McLean, CEO, Third Millennium Consultants, LLC
(Mar. 21, 2005, 09:28) (on file with author).
18 The cost of computing power has progressively fallen. Currently, securing
a supercomputer's power costs $100,000. Om Malik, The Super-Cheap Supercom-
puter, Bus. 2.0, May 2005, at 30 (analyzing the falling cost of"supercomputers").
19 Jeff Tyson, How Virtual Private Networks Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/vpn.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006) (explaining
the intricacies of different types of virtual private networks).
20 id.
2006]
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from $100 to $10,000, depending on the system's security features
and the number of routers required. 2' However, once operational,
VPNs are cheap to operate, costing less than one cent per minute. 2
In contrast to hardware requirements, the biggest expenses associ-
ated with starting up a telemedical business are the purchase of soft-
ware and the cost to secure a contract to provide telemedical services.
Imaging software available at retail outlets, like the popular Photo-
shop,23 provide images with insufficient resolution for telemedicine
and special medical-grade imaging software is needed.24 Like any
software, the price of medical-grade imaging software is variable
($30,000-$200,000), depending on the brand name of the product and
editing features desired.25 The other major expense associated with the
opening of a telemedical business is the cost of the opportunity; i.e.,
the cost of negotiating the contract. If one has to fly around the coun-
try to wine and dine hospital CEOs to negotiate a contract, this can
quickly become expensive. On the other hand, if a reputable physician
has a good existing relationship with a hospital CEO, the cost to se-
cure a contract may be minimal. In short, in the best case scenario,
where a physician has an existing relationship with a hospital, the
physician could potentially start a telemedical business with an in-
vestment of as little as $150,000 to cover the cost of the computer,
VPN, and software.
Given that minimal start-up capital is required to gain access to
the telemedical marketplace, it is not surprising that many providers
have already entered the field. In fact, so many providers have entered
the field that it is already possible to discern two operational para-
digms for providing telemedical services: the nighthawk 26 and the
21 See id. See also Telephone Interview with Lynda A. Cleveland, Telecom-
munication Attorney, in Overland Park, Kan. (Mar. 23, 2005).
2 Telephone Interview with Lynda A. Cleveland, supra note 21. Cost figures
are based on the cost to purchase service in the United States and may be lower if
purchased in another country.
23 Adobe Photoshop CS2, Product Overview, http://www.adobe.com/
products/p hotoshop/overview.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
2 E-mail from Jafar Amini, MD, supra note 17.
25 Id The cost of telemedical data is difficult to estimate, and therefore out-
side of the scope of this article. See Randall Stross, Whoops! We Seem to Have Mis-
placed Your Identity, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at BU5 (observing that because of the
transmission time required to store large amounts of data, even with TI lines, digital
data on CDs and tapes is being trucked to long-term storage areas).
26 This brief composite description is based on the viewing of several tele-
medical web pages. See, e.g., Nighthawk Radiology Servs., About Nighthawk Radi-
ology Services, http://www.nighthawkrad.net/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2006); Am. Radi-
ology Servs., Inc., http://www3.americanradiology.com/pls/webl/wwmain.home (last
visited Mar. 13, 2006); and Virtual Radiologic, http://www.virtualrad.net/index.shtml
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Indian27 model. With the nighthawk model, a group of U.S.-trained
physicians established a business entity within the United States to
provide telemedical services for a number of U.S. hospitals. 28 In par-
ticular, nighthawk telemedical providers contract to provide a hospital
with coverage during the third shift (11:00 P.M.-7:00 A.M.). 29 On this
shift it is hard to find qualified domestic providers. 30 The nighthawk
company deploys its physician staff on a rotating basis to Sydney,
Australia or Barcelona, Spain. 31 By moving its physician staff to these
remote cities, nighthawk telemedicine providers can provide consulta-
tive services from awake physicians during the day in Sydney or Bar-
celona to hospitals in the United States on the third shift.3 2 The city
chosen turns on the need for the city to be several time zones ahead or
behind the United States, as well as climate and living conditions.33
The Indian operational model of telemedicine is also designed to
provide radiologic consultative services to U.S. hospitals on the third
shift. In contrast to the nighthawk model, Indian telemedicine provid-
ers are incorporated in, and hire its physician staff from, India.34
These differences, which to the non-legal world are subtle, have a
significant impact on the potential for provider liability due to juris-
dictional concerns. Nighthawk telemedical providers, because they are
incorporated in the United States, are clearly subject to jurisdiction in
the United States, whereas Indian telemedicine providers appear
unlikely to be subjected to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court.35 This ap-
(last visited Mar. 13, 2006). However, the composite description provided in this
article does not accurately portray the actual operation of any particular company.
27 This brief description is based on viewing several telemedical web pages.
See, e.g., K. Vijaya, Teleradiology Solutions: Taking Expertise to Hospitals in US,
ExPREss HEALTHCARE MGMT., Feb. 16-29, 2004, http://www.Expresshealthcare
mgmt.com/20040229/innews07.shtml; and Mysore Hospital Launches Telemedicine,
HINDU, Mar. 25, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/2005/03/25/stories/2005032509060300
.htm. However, the composite description provided in this article does not accurately
portray the actual operation of any particular company.
28 Nighthawk Radiology Servs., supra note 26.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
31 See id.
34 The term "Indian model" is a descriptive term for a telemedical operation
that is in widespread use in India and distinguishable from the nighthawk model.
Nothing limits the use of this operational model to the country of India. Conceptually
this model could be used in other countries including Australia or Spain. In fact, the
operational model of any telemedical provider should not be assumed, but rather
investigated prior to entering into any contract for services or initiating litigation.
" See infra Part II.B.4. Note the focus of this section of the article is narrow
and the related topic of enforcement of a foreign judgment is beyond the scope of this
20061
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parent absence of liability, in turn, gives the Indian model a competi-
tive advantage in the marketplace over and above the fact that Indian
telemedicine providers can purchase physician services cheaper than
the nighthawk providers. More specifically, because many Indian
telemedical providers perceive themselves as beyond U.S. jurisdiction
and therefore are faced with little exposure to liability, Indian tele-
medicine providers can avoid the cost of insurance. 36 The perception
that Indian telemedical providers have minimal exposure to medical
liability has already encouraged Indian telemedical providers to take
risks37 that the nighthawk providers could never take.
B. Upside: Controlling the Cost of Health Care
At present, most of the outsourcing of telemedical services in this
country is done to provide medical coverage on the third shift when it
is hard to find U.S. physicians who are awake. Yet because telemedi-
cal services purchased under the Indian model allow purchasers in the
United States to tap into a low-wage labor pool, U.S. health care pur-
chasers could potentially lower their expenses by purchasing more
medical services from Indian vendors.38 Independent of the potential
for cost-cutting competition of Indian model vendors, increased use of
telemedicine could potentially stabilize the cost of health care because
of improvements in access to care, creation of economies-of-scale,
article.
36 Based on provider wages, the India model is more cost efficient when
compared to the nighthawk model. Nighthawk physicians generally receive wages
comparable to what they would receive in the United States, while physicians work-
ing under the Indian model receive about 10 percent of what their nighthawk counter-
parts receive for the same work. See generally McLean, supra note 1, at 212-15; and
Andrew Pollack, Who's Reading Your X-Ray?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, § 3, at 1
(discussing the wages of Indian radiologists).
37 Such risks include hiring unlicensed physicians. Rob Stein, Hospital Ser-
vices Performed Overseas, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2005, at AOl (discussing unlicensed
professionals reading x-rays).
38 Telemedicine is an example of a "disruptive innovation," i.e. an innovation
that allows a service to be provided cheaper and in a more convenient fashion than
traditional medicine because it eliminates the need to have a physician directly in-
volved providing the service. See Clayton M. Christensen et al., Will Disruptive Inno-
vations Cure Health Care?, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102, 104 (defining
disruptive innovations). The history of technology teaches that when a disruptive
innovation is first introduced to a market it meets resistance from those whom have a
vested interest in the traditional technology. Id. at 103. However, over time the effi-
ciencies associated with the disruptive technology ultimately displace the older and
more established technologies. Id. at 104. See also Bruce Lytle & Michael Mack, The
Future of Cardiac Surgery: The Times, They Are a Changin', 79 ANNALS THORACIC
SURGERY 1470, 1470 (2005) (the rules for disruptive technology apply to medicine).
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reduction of medical errors, and improved competition amongst pro-
viders. If such cost savings can actually be demonstrated, it is likely
that more telemedical services will be utilized on the first- and sec-
ond-shifts-not so much because providers cannot be found, but
rather because it will be more cost-effective.
1. Access to Care
Thus far, virtually all studies concerning telemedical operations
have presumed that telemedicine improves access to care.3 9 This pre-
sumption is important because of the Iron Triangle of health care,
which refers to the concept that excellence in health care is not deter-
mined by access to care, quality, or cost individually.40 Rather, excel-
lence in health care is a function of all three variables. 4 1 Like any tri-
angle, if one angle is changed, so must the other two: health care's
Iron Triangle is no different. If access to care improves, in general, the
cost of health care decreases. Because of the triangular relationship
the reduction of health care costs does not fall linearly with improve-
ments in access to care.
2. Economies-of-Scale
Telemedicine will also help to control health care costs by estab-
lishing economies-of-scale. An idea that originated in the Industrial
Age, the concept of economies-of-scale refers to "the idea that profit
margins can be improved by acquiring certain efficiencies associated
with mass production of a good or service."42 For example, consider
the efficiencies that could be achieved in the field of radiology, when
telemedicine becomes more common place, and radiology services are
39 Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Telemedicine Reimbursement: Raising the Iron
Triangle to a New Plateau, 13 HEALTH MATRix 371, 398 (2003). That telemedicine
axiomatically improves access to care is indirectly corroborated by the fact that many
of the less developed countries are already willing to invest in telemedical systems
despite a scarcity of health care dollars. MEDLINE Abstracts: Development of Tele-
medicine in Foreign Countries, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/449090 (last
visited Jan. 5, 2006) (a collection of ten abstracts reporting the result of telemedicine
pilot projects that are being set up in third world countries). See also John D. Blum,
The Role of Law in Global E-Health: A Toolfor Development and Equity in a Digi-
tally Divided World, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 85 (2002) (discussing telemedicine in less
developed countries).
40 Richard P. Wenzel & James E. Rohrer, The Iron Triangle of Health Care
Reform, 2 CLINICAL PERFORMANCE & QUALITY HEALTH CARE 7, 8 (1994).
41 Id.; McLean, supra note 1, at 255.
42 Thomas R. McLean, Cybersurgery: Innovation or a Means to Close
Community Hospitals and Displace Physicians?, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 495, 513 (2002) (defining economies of scale).
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outsourced on the first and second shifts in addition to the present
practice of only outsourcing radiology services on the third shift. To-
day, it is not unusual for a radiologist, or a group of radiologists, to
interpret all of a hospital's radiographs under an exclusive contract.
For most radiologists, this task does not take the entire day. However,
because of either a restrictive covenant in the radiologist's exclusive
contract with the hospital or the geographic distance to another hospi-
tal, radiologists often find that they do not practice their profession for
an entire eight-hour day. Not surprisingly, these contractual and geo-
graphic limitations placed on the practice of radiologists contributed
to the impression that there is a shortage, especially in rural areas, of
these physicians.43
But in a telemedical world, it will be possible to concentrate
radiologic expertise in centers-of-excellence that will receive x-ray
studies from multiple hospitals. In fact it is not hard to imagine
a telemedical center where radiologists work around the clock, in
full eight-hour shifts, twenty-four/seven to perform all of the x-
ray interpretations for images generated in a five-state area.
44
Additionally, nothing prevents such a teleradiology center from
competing to provide service on the third shift in hospitals in
countries eight time zones ahead or behind. That is, a teleradiology
center of excellence would have the manpower to compete with a
radiologist in Spain and Australia, just as physicians in these countries
are currently competing with U.S. radiologists. Moreover, when
clinical material is concentrated into a single center, the economies-
of-scale will cause the net unit-cost for radiographic interpretation to
fall below the costs currently generated by radiologists interpreting
films under exclusive contracts in community hospitals.
3. Improving Patient Safety
Teleradiology centers-of-excellence would not only be economi-
cally efficient, but they would also provide intangible benefits in
terms of patient safety.4 5 Radiologists, like any physicians, make mis-
43 Chris Wolski, Staffing Up, DECISIONS IN IMAGING ECON., June 2004,
available at www.imagingeconomics.com/library/200406-06.asp (discussing short-
ages of radiologists in rural areas).
44 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, US. Hospitals Use Technology for Follow-
the-Sun Care, American Radiologists Relocate to Australia to Work the Night Shift in
an Iowa ER, INFO. WK., Nov. 3, 2004, available at http://informationweek.com/
story/showArticle.jhtlm?articlelD=51202584 (discussing how teleradiologists work
full eight-hour shifts).
45 INST. OF MED., PATIENT SAFETY: ACHIEVING A NEW STANDARD FOR CARE 8
(Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the non-economic benefits of telemedi-
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takes. But the error rate for radiologists, in many cases, is excessive
by anyone's yard stick. For example, the misperception rate for lung
cancer on an initial chest x-ray in the medical literature runs 25-90
percent.46 The government is well aware that by concentrating a lot of
clinical work into a few centers-of-excellence there is a reasonable
expectation that the error rate per interpretation will fall.47 Minimizing
the number of errors that occur by using centers-of-excellence, in turn,
is beneficial not only because patient harm is avoided, but also be-
cause minimization of medical errors eliminates the need to pay for
remedial medical care. 8
4. Stimulation of Competition
Perhaps the most important method by which telemedicine will
impact health care costs is by stimulating competition. Centers-of-
excellence that operate twenty-four hours per day, regardless of
whether they are located in the United States or abroad, will have a
competitive advantage because consultative assistance and service is
always available.4 9 Having telemedical expertise readily available will
mean that non-urban hospitals will not have to enter into lucrative and
exclusive contracts with radiologists that in essence grant a provider a
market monopoly. This observation is corroborated by a recent com-
prehensive analysis of the health care marketplace wherein the U.S.
government favorably commented on the ability of telemedicine to
break down geographic barriers and stimulate competition.5 ° While it
is true that the degree to which telemedicine will actually impact
health care costs remains speculative, 5 1 the limitations associated with
cine).
46 Thomas R. McLean, Why Do Physicians Who Treat Lung Cancer Get
Sued?, 126 CHEST 1672, 1676 (2004) (discussing the misperception rate for lung
cancer on an initial chest x-ray).
47 McLean, supra note 14, at 334-35 (asserting CMS's model of information
sharing increases the effectiveness and quality of government provided health care).
48 See generally INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). Cf McLean, supra note 42, at
513-14 (at some point a maximum benefit is reached with economies of scale, after
which the cost per unit increases as does the error rate).
49 See generally John Heilemann, In Through the Outsourcing Door, Bus.
2.0, Nov. 1, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/
2004/11/01/8189367/index.htm.
50 FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION 23 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/
040723healthcarept.pdf (contemplating the use of telemedicine as method to increase
competition among providers).
51 Speculation remains because of the absence of large-scale telemedicine
models to study. Few large-scale telemedicine operations exist due to regulatory
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telemedical pecuniary data "is not that studies have strong evidence
against efficacy, but rather that their methodologies preclude
definitive statements. ' 2
Not only will telemedicine stimulate competition in the domestic
market, telemedicine will also stimulate global competition for health
care services. In fact, some centers-of-excellence are already eyeing
foreign medical markets as lucrative sources of revenue. For example,
Dr. Eric Tangalos from the Mayo Clinic has opined that if the United
States were to export its telemedical expertise, the United States could
earn enough "money to fund our domestic health care system., 53 Even
if Professor Tangalos' estimate is 50 percent off, the amount of money
that can be earned in the global telemedicine market is prodigious.
Accordingly, because of the substantial potential for earnings in
global telemedicine, 54 it is to be expected that this market will increas-
ingly attract lobbyists from corporate America who will push Con-
gress for more favorable trade laws to protect the large domestic tele-
medical market from low-wage providers from abroad, while at the
same time these lobbyists will push for regulations that assist tele-
medicine centers-of-excellence to expand abroad.
C. Downside: Unintended Consequences
1. Liability
Telemedicine, like any new technology, will not be a panacea for
all that ails the U.S. health care marketplace. Just as the invention of
the steam engine improved the quality of life while at the same time
introducing previously unheard of injuries to society, so too will tele-
medicine likely improve the quality of medical care while at the same
time creating unheard of medical injuries. From its inception, when
telemedicine was largely limited to video teleconferencing between
physicians, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) has recognized that the
uncertainty and trade barriers. McLean, supra note 1, at 258. These subjects will be
elaborated upon infra Part II.
2 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, TELEMEDICINE FOR THE
MEDICARE POPULATION (2001), http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcsums/telemedsum.
htm.
53 McLean, supra note 42, at 514 (quoting Telemedicine: An Information
Highway to Save Lives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Over-
sight of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. 2, at
73 (1994) (written testimony of Dr. Eric G. Tangalos, M.D., Associate Professor of
Medicine, Mayo Clinic)).
54 See WHO INDIA REPORT, supra note 2, at 63, 65; Merrell, supra note 5, at
9-13; and AOL to Start VOIP Service, supra note 5, at C3.
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uniqueness of telemedical relationships would challenge the tradi-
tional medical malpractice laws to redress novel telemedically medi-
ated injuries. 55 Recent experience with electronic medical records
confirms that software-assisted medical practice introduces latent er-
rors into clinical practice.56 The question that now arises: How should
society redress telemedical mediated injuries? Such concerns will only
increase with time as utilization of remote robotic surgery and other
advanced telemedical technologies become more common place.57 In
addition, the calculus of telemedicine malpractice will be complicated
by issues of international jurisdiction.5 8 In fact, it is the complexity of
calculating exposure to liability in the telemedical market, and not the
capital requirements, that chills many investors contemplating enter-
ing the telemedical marketplace.
2. Impact of Disruptive Technology
Still, even if medical liability issues could be magically waved
away, telemedicine would still disrupt the practice of medicine. Tele-
medicine, along with genetic engineering and regenerative research
(i.e., stem cell research), threaten to undercut the central role of hospi-
tals in our health care delivery system.59 In particular, telemedicine
55 See INST. OF MED., TELEMEDICINE: A GUIDE TO ASSESSING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTH CARE 96-100 (Marilyn J. Field ed., 1996).
56 Ross Koppel et al., Role of Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems
in Facilitating Medication Errors, 293 JAMA 1197, 1197-1203 (2005) (providing
that computerized ordering of medication facilitated certain medication errors);
Robert L. Wears & Marc Berg, Computer Technology and Clinical Work: Still Wait-
ingfor Godot, 293 JAMA 1261, 1261-63 (2005) (problems with medical software
are not due to bugs, but rather due to poorly designed software with linear decisions
being applied to complex decision-making scenarios); Amit X. Garg et al., Effects of
Computerized Clinical Decision Support Systems on Practitioner Performance and
Patient Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 293 JAMA 1223, 1223, 1236 (2005) (com-
puter driven decision-making improves guideline compliance but not necessarily
patient outcome). See also Jonathan Jacky, Safety-Critical Computing: Hazards,
Practices, Standards, and Regulation, in COMPUTERIZATION AND CONTROVERSY:
VALUE CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL CHOICES 767 (Rob Kling ed., Academic Press 2d ed.
1996) (1991) (discussing how a software glitch in Therac-25 resulted in several pa-
tients receiving excessive doses of radiation).
57 See generally Thomas R. McLean, Cybersurgery--An Argument for En-
terprise Liability, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 167 (2002) (discussing concerns connected with
remote robotic surgery and other advanced telemedical technologies).
58 McLean, supra note 1, at 247-48; Nathaniel H. Hwang, Comment, You've
Got Mail: The Concerns of Electronically Outsourcing Radiological Services Over-
seas, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 469 (2004) (analyzing the outsourcing of radiology overseas).
59 Jeff Goldsmith, Technology and the Boundaries of the Hospital: Three
Emerging Technologies, 23 HEALTH AFF. 149, 155. Other factors, such as disease
management guidelines, are also undermining the central role of the hospital in the
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centers-of-excellence, which will operate with previously unheard of
efficiencies, seem ideally designed to eliminate a lot of medical care
that is currently provided by community hospitals. Worse, this assault
on community hospitals will not be limited to forays by domestic pro-
viders, as telemedical centers-of-excellence can be located anywhere
in the world. The reality is that foreign telemedical centers-of-
excellence that employ a low-wage labor pool of physicians and are
perceived to be beyond U.S. jurisdiction will provide unprecedented
price competition to community hospitals. In short, for many provid-
ers in this country, both hospitals and physicians alike, it is this threat
of foreign competition that has raised a rather interesting question:
Just how should America protect its domestic health care market from
foreign invasion?
II. REGULATIONS AS TRADE BARRIERS
A. Introduction
Viewed broadly, markets can be protected from foreign
competition by a number of methods that limit access to the market,
including excessive capital requirements, sustained disruption of
transportation or communication networks, or the implementation of
regulations that raise transaction costs to prohibitive levels.60 Because
telemedicine has minimal capital requirements and sustained
disruption of Internet or intercontinental transportation seems
unlikely, trade barriers are the primary method used to protect the
U.S. telemedicine market.61 More formally, trade barriers are
U.S. health care system. Press Release, Second National Reports on Quality and
Disparities Find Improvements in Health Care Quality, Although Disparities Remain,
(Feb. 22, 2005), available at www.ahrq.gov/news/press/pr2005/nhqdr04pr.htm.
60 Other economists offer slightly different analyses to health care market
access. See Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services 26, (Comm'n on Macroeconom-
ics & Health, Working Paper No. WG 4:5, June 2001) ("[tlhere are three broad cate-
gories of barriers to trade in health services.... : [1] restrictions on entry and terms of
practice by foreign ... providers; [2] restrictions on foreign direct investment... ;
and [3] domestic infrastructural, regulatory, and capacity constraints"); Matthew S.
Yeo, International Trade in eHealth Services: Obstacles and Opportunities, University
of Michigan/WHO Symposium on Telemedicine, available at http://www.med.
umich.edu/ telemedicine/Symposium/yeo.PPT (last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (finding the
barriers in telemedicine to be: (1) cultural (local traditions); (2) socio-political (public
v. private); (3) ethical (doctor-patient relationship); (4) technologic; and (5) legal and
regulatory which is the greatest barrier). A detailed comparison of the various eco-
nomic schemes to analyze barriers to market entry is beyond the scope of this article.
61 George Wiley, Day for Night: The Development of Long-Distance Read-
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"regulations and measures imposed by [governmental agencies] that
unduly impede trade in goods or services, in export or import. 62
Basically a trade barrier is any regulation that unreasonably increases
the costs of a transaction to protect a market,63 and until the twentieth
century, trade barriers were the fundamental method by which the
United States protected its nascent industries.64
However, before delving into a detailed discussion of trade barri-
ers, a limiting comment on the interactions of regulations and transac-
tion costs is in order. Although virtually all regulations increase the
costs associated with a transaction, not all regulations are designed to
limit market access by unduly increasing the cost of transactions. In
general, non-trade barrier regulations that increase transaction costs
fall into three broad categories: reasonable market restraints, protec-
tion of so-called natural monopolies, and disclosure regulations.
Regulations of the oil market are perhaps the best example of rea-
sonable market restraint regulations as they serve to protect the oil
market from itself. Because oil is a limited commodity, absent drill-
ing, pumping, and shipping regulations, once an oil reserve is found,
the oil would be pumped out as fast as possible, the market would be
flooded, and the price of oil would fall.65 Accordingly, regulations
concerning oil production help to stabilize the oil market even though
such regulations do, to a degree, increase the costs of bringing oil to
market. Natural monopolies, like utilities, are generally industries that
operate most cost-effectively only in large-scale markets. If natural
monopolies are deregulated so that small companies can afford to get
into the market, the resulting loss of efficiencies by the natural mo-
ing, IMAGING ECON., Nov. 2002, available at http://www.imagingeconomics.com/
library/200211-03.asp (state licensure has protected the teleradiology market); George
Wiley, Warning: Teleradioactive?, IMAGING ECON., Nov.-Dec. 2000, available at
http://www.imagingeconomics.com/library/200011-02.asp (describing the current and
future market in teleradiology).
2 Ministry of Trade & Indus., supra note 9 (emphasis added). More gener-
ally, a trade barrier is any device used by a government to impede the establishment
of a new industry. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 308 (1947).
63 A detailed discussion of the impact of transaction costs on the market is
beyond the scope of this article. See generally R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW (1988) (discussing the origins and relationships between economic
markets and society, and the legally defined formations which eventually arise).
64 Rebecca Edwards, Protective Tariffs, http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/tariff.
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (providing a brief history of protective tariffs in the
United States in 1896).
65 DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE Epic QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER
32-3 3, 52 (1991) (providing a history of the oil market while exploring the intricacies
of its economic impact).
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nopoly often causes prices to rise.6 6 Lastly, the impact of disclosure
regulations on transactions is perhaps best illustrated by certain stock
market regulations. Compliance with stock market disclosure re-
quirements clearly makes stock transactions more expensive, but few
would argue that such information is not important to the investing
public.
67
B. Levels of Market Regulation
1. Federal
If we now consider the telemedicine market, the question arises:
Which regulations are needed for market stabilization and which regu-
lations are designed to protect the market? At the federal level there
are several types of medical regulations that potentially may be used
to protect the domestic telemedical market including payment, visa
status, and transmission of medical data.68 Medicare funds may not be
used to reimburse foreign providers for medical services.69 Yet, by
regulating who can be paid for medical services, the federal govern-
ment has potentially erected a trade barrier to telemedicine providers
using the Indian model. Limiting the distribution of Medicare pay-
ments to only U.S. providers acts as a significant disincentive for non-
nighthawk foreign telemedicine providers because it limits the effec-
tive size of the U.S. health care market open to the foreign provider.
But even if the federal government would reimburse foreign tele-
medical providers, these providers may still not be able to compete for
patients because of their visa status. An interesting, yet unsettled ques-
tion, is whether an offshore physician who telemedically examines an
66 See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys
IN THE RooM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2004)
(providing Enron as an example of natural monopolies and how costs rise after their
dissolution).
67 See generally FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND
RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003) (describing emergent investment
techniques and their shortfalls). Cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A
NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE (2003) (asymmetric
knowledge of markets and market regulations means that some individuals will profit
handsomely).
68 While the U.S. laws and regulations concerning intellectual property im-
pacts telemedicine and could be used as a trade barrier, such a discussion is beyond
the scope of this article. Readers interested in this subject are encouraged to see Blum,
supra note 39 (discussing the impact of domestic intellectual property and TRIPS on
the telemedicine marketplace).
69 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(4) (2000) (stating the exemptions of Medicare pay-
ment and coverage for services outside the United States).
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American patient through the vastness of cyberspace needs a visa to
enter this country. 7° A reasonable argument can be advanced for re-
quiring a foreign telemedicine physician to hold an appropriate visa
before examining a U.S. patient, just as any foreign physician, who is
physically present in the United States, would be required to obtain a
visa prior to examining a patient in this country. 71 If such a visa re-
quirement were imposed on telemedical providers, nighthawk provid-
ers would have a competitive advantage in the marketplace because
such providers would not need to obtain a visa. On the other hand,
under GATS, while a country is free to regulate the entry and tempo-
rary lengths of stay of foreign individuals, a country may not enact
regulations that would nullify a prior trade-in-services commitment.
72
Thus, if the United States were to impose visa requirements on tele-
medical providers using the Indian model, the United States may have
to face trade sanctions under GATS. Consequently, given the impon-
derables that need to be weighed, it may be some time before a firm
answer exists as to whether a foreign telemedicine provider requires a
visa.
The final federal law or regulation(s) that could potentially act as
a trade barrier to protect the U.S. domestic telemedicine market is the
myriad of regulations that flow from the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).73 HIPAA covers stored or
transmitted protected patient information (PPI) 74. Thus, HIPAA cov-
70 A detailed discussion of the need for visas in medicine is beyond the scope
of this article. See generally Amy Hagopian et al., Health Departments' Use of Inter-
national Medical Graduates in Physician Shortage Areas, 22 HEALTH AFF. 241, 241
(2003); Myrle Croasdale, Visa Complications Snare Physicians; Hospitals Scramble,
AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at 1 (recounting the stories of a foreign-born physi-
cian's difficulty when reentering the United States).
71 Interview with Amy J. Sokol, Vice-President and General Counsel,
Carondelet Health (Oct. 20, 2004).
72 Hamid Mamdouh, Director, Trade in Services Division, World Trade
Organization, Movement of Natural Persons Under the GATS, Presentation to WTO
Seminar on Trade and Migration (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.iom.int/
DOCUMENTS/OFFICIALTXT/EN/TMS200410_HamidMamdouh.ppt#5. Due to
the complexity of this subject matter, further discussion of the movement of natural
persons under GATS is beyond the scope of this article. See generally NISHITH DESAI
Assocs., MOVEMENT OF NATURAL PERSONS UNDER THE GATS IN THE SOFTWARE
SERVICES SECTOR, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv-e/sympapr
02_parikh-e.doc (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (providing a more detailed discussion of
the GATS and immigration issues).
73 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 42
and 45 U.S.C.). A detailed discussion of this subject, which is ubiquitous in current
health care law review articles, is beyond the scope of this article.
74 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 §§ 1171,
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ers telemedical transmitted patient data.75 Not only does failure to
comply with HIPAA's regulations expose a foreign provider to sub-
stantial civil and criminal penalties, 76 but compliance with HIPAA's
regulations is also expensive. 77 Not surprisingly, because of the ex-
pense associated with HIPAA compliance some commentators have
viewed HIPAA's regulation as a form of a federal trade barrier.
78
On the other hand, some overseas providers look at HIPAA as a
marketing opportunity. For example, some overseas providers view
"HIPAA compliance" as an advertisement lure. For example, GeBBS
Healthcare Solutions, an international outsourcing company, has a
web advertisement that suggests the company is compliant with
HIPAA. 79 But what HIPAA compliance means in this context is ques-
tionable. Under HIPAA, companies like GeBBS Healthcare Solutions
would be classified as a business partner.8 ° Consequently, the only
way a company like GeBBS would be exposed to HIPAA liability is
if the company entered into a covered entity agreement.81 Absent the
latter, overseas companies have little incentive to truly comply with
HIPAA. In short, for anyone contemplating the purchase of telemedi-
cal services from an overseas provider, it would be prudent to dili-
gently consider exposure to HIPPA liability.
1173.
75 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 §§ 1171,
1173.
76 HIPAA non-compliance has already caused embarrassment for the Uni-
versity of California-San Francisco and other institutions. See Tyler Chin, Doctors
also Ship Work Overseas (But They Don't always Know It): Offshore Outsourcing
Can Save Physicians Money, But Can also Present Potential HIPAA Problems, AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 10, 2003, at 20, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2003/1 1/10/bisbl 1 10.htm; and Tyler Chin, Calif may Ban Foreign Outsourcing of
Patient Files, Five Other States Are Considering Restrictions on Handling Private
Data by Offshore Contractors, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004, at 16.
77 See Amy J. Sokol, HIPAA after April 14, 2003-Privacy, Security and
Complaints, 12 LEGAL MED. PERSP. 35 35-36 (2003) (discussing how the complexity
of HIPAA's securit' rule must be individually customized for a particular provider's
situation); and Vox Healthcare: eHealthcare-Rural Telemedicine: Case Study: Com-
munity Healthnet, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/rural/presentationsIVox2communityhealth
net.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
78 Yeo, supra note 60.
79 GeBBS Healthcare Solutions, http://www.gebbs.com/healthcareBPOser
vices.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
80 For a more detailed discussion see Marie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy of
HIPAA 's Privacy Rule: The Plain Language Notice of Privacy Practices and Patient
Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 579 (2004).
81 See id at 590. The impact and validity of a patient's waiver of HIPAA
protection is beyond the scope of this article.
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While this survey of federal regulations concerning payment, im-
migration, and electronic medical data transmission has been brief,
none of these regulations appear unduly burdensome when it comes to
international trade-in-telemedical-services. Payment regulations serve
to protect the Treasury, visa regulations serve to protect the sovereign
boarders of the nation, and HIPAA promotes the transference of elec-
tronic medical data by imposing comprehensive and unified standards
on all health care providers. In fact, unified regulatory schemes have
the potential to reduce transaction costs by the elimination of regula-
82tion uncertainty. Taking a long view, because of the significant
beneficial effects flowing from federal payment, immigration, and
electronic medical data transmission laws and regulations, these laws
and regulations do not appear to unduly burden medical transactions.
Rather these laws and regulations, on balance, appear designed to
stabilize health care transactions. Accordingly, at the federal level
today, the laws and regulations that impact the practice of telemedi-
cine do not appear to act as trade barriers.
2. State
However, in contrast to the federal regulations, state medical li-
censure acts have become the mechanism by which the domestic U.S.
telemedicine markets are protected. 83 And in a close second for tele-
medical market protection are state laws that mandate that providers
are to purchase medical malpractice coverage as a condition of licen-
sure. Although the evidence supporting the conclusion that mandated
medical malpractice coverage regulations act as telemedical trade
barriers is circumspect, there is clearly the potential for mandated
insurance coverage to act as trade barrier.
a) Medical Licensure Acts
Since colonial times, medicine has been regulated primarily at the
state level.84 This traditional view, which was recently reaffirmed by
82 Although HIPAA compliance comes only after substantial initial invest-
ment, over the long run HIPAA compliance is expected to reduce transaction costs.
MARILYN HAILPERIN, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: HIPAA's EDI STANDARDS SUPPORT
STRATEGIC BUSINESS OBJECTIVES, http://www.ctg.be/pdf/beyond%20compliance.pdf
(last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
83 Concerns over state licensure laws acting as a trade barrier to professional
practice are not limited to medicine. See generally Stephen M. Worth, The Transna-
tional Practice of Law: Staggering Growth in Spite of Economic and Regulatory
Barriers to Entry, 7 GONZ. J. INT'L L. (2003-04).
84 Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical
Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
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the Supreme Court,8 5 has allowed the states to use their medical licen-
sure acts to regulate the "quality of medical care providers within their
boundaries according to their fiscal resources and the needs of their
populace., 86 Absent a medical license, a physician cannot legally
practice medicine within a state's jurisdiction. 7 Yet, these same laws,
which are intended to ensure that providers meet some minimal stan-
dards, also serve to protect a state's provider-labor pool by erecting
protective trade barriers that, in effect, grant providers with a monop-
oly for rendering health care services in a state.88
Telemedicine has brought the discussion of the purpose of state
medical licensure acts to a boil. Given that the technical and capital
requirements to enter the telemedical market are minimal, absent state
licensure, there is virtually nothing to prevent remote providers from
slipping across a state or national border to provide medical care. On
the other hand, obtaining and maintaining a state medical license can
be costly both in terms of time and money.89 The substantial costs of a
obtaining a medical license escalate quickly as a physician seeks li-
censure in multiple states. In addition, once multiple state medical
licenses are obtained there are often the added burdens of: (1) obtain-
ing mandated insurance coverage,90 (2) maintaining an in-state office
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L.
201, 202 (1999) (discussing state regulation of managed care organizations).
85 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
86 Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physician
Extenders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for Health Care
Delivery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 252 (2002).
%7 For simplicity, this article only discusses the licensure of physicians. Hos-
pitals have their own licensure/approval requirements, e.g., Certificate of Need, but
discussion of hospital licensure is beyond the scope of this article.
88 McLean, supra note 86, at 250-5 1.
89 While requirements vary from state to state, obtaining a medical license is
at least as difficult as obtaining a law license; and like a law license, many states
impose continuing education requirements on license holders. Moreover, the penalties
for practicing medicine without a license can be substantial. See, e.g., TEX. OCC.
CODE ANN. § 151.056 (Vernon 1999). Practicing medicine without a license in Texas
is a class A misdemeanor, which for the first offense is punishable by a fine of up
$4,000 and/or up to one year in jail. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Vernon 1999).
As a general rule, a telemedical provider must have full-licensure status to provide
medical services in a remote state. However, six states only require telemedical pro-
viders to have special purpose licensure. See ALA. CODE § 34-24-502 (2006) (Ala-
bama); S.B. 241, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2000) (Delaware, this bill was assigned to
Delaware's Senate Judiciary Committee on Jan. 17, 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-
301 (2005) (Montana); S.B. 600, 70th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999) (Oregon);
TENN. Comp. R. & REGS. 0880-2-16 (2005) (Tennessee); and 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §
163.14 (2006) (Texas).90 McLean, supra note 86, at 271-72.
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to perform physical examinations, 91 and (3) accumulating continuing
medical education credits. In short, unlike the minimal capital re-
quirement to become a telemedical provider, market access is signifi-
cantly limited to telemedical providers by the need to be in compli-
ance with a state's medical licensure laws.
9 2
In fact, it is precisely because of the high costs associated with li-
censure compliance that states have used their licensure laws as the
preferred mechanism to protect their indigenous physician labor pool
from foreign competition. 93 Consequently, in the current market, when
a state finds a provider who uses cyberspace to avoid compliance with
its licensure act, that state will aggressively prosecute the provider.
For example, the state of North Dakota revoked the medical licenses
of Dr. Jones, a telemedical provider, because he failed to perform a
physical examination on a North Dakota patient before prescribing
medications.94 Similarly, the State of Illinois closed down an out-of-
state telemedical provider's operation because the provider did not
perform a physical examination.9 5 Moreover, because of reciprocal
discipline statutes, the revocation a medical license in one state has
significant impact on a telemedical provider's livelihood. Reciprocal
discipline statutes, which allow a second state to impose the same or
similar discipline on a provider as an adjudicating state, can nega-
tively impact a provider's livelihood because once a provider's license
is revoked by one state, reciprocal discipline statutes ensure that it is
only a matter of time before all of a provider's licenses to practice
medicine are revoked.
96
91 Robert J. Waters, Presentation to the Center for Telemedicine Law, Wash-
ington, DC, Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Telehealth Services on the Internet:
Federal Trade Commission Workshop (Oct. 9, 2002) (on file with author) (observing
that by enactment, regulation, or policy, twenty-seven states require a physical ex-
amination before prescribing medication).
92 Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine,
25 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 328 n.7 (1999) (state licensure laws act to inhibit the expan-
sion of telemedicine).
93 See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Telemedicine Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/teleleg.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (provid-
ing a legislative summary of telemedicine-related laws); Pam Brinegar & Melissa
McGinley, Telepractice and Professional Licensing: A Guide for Legislators (1998),
http://www.clearhq.org/teleguide.htm.
94 Jones v. N.D. State Bd. of Med. Examiners-Investigative Panel, 691
N.W.2d 251 (N.D. 2005) (an appropriate examination is required by North Dakota
licensure law).
95 Ann Carms, Illinois Orders Indiana Web Site to Stop Offering Medical
Service, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at D4 (discussing the Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation's order against Mydoc.com).96 Ramirez v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 806 N.E.2d 410 (Mass. 2004)
20061
HEALTH MATRIX
b) Malpractice Coverage
In many states, obtaining prescribed medical malpractice cover-
age is a precondition to holding a valid medical license.97 Like the
field of medicine, the traditional view of insurance regulation was that
it belonged to the states because the business of insurance concerns
indemnity contracts and not interstate commerce. 98 This view of in-
surance was formalized in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which de-
clared that the business of insurance is regulated by the states.99
Thus, each state is free to set up its own insurance requirements
for its health care providers. 100 Nathan Hwang has argued that such an
approach to telemedical malpractice coverage is appropriate because
the states are the proper party to set balancing points between the po-
tential for patient harm and allowing providers the opportunity to out-
source some of their medical services to help control costs.' 0 ' Still,
while there is little question that mandated professional insurance
coverage increases the costs of providing health care,10 2 as in the case
of federal regulations concerning payment, visas, and electronic medi-
cal records, something more is needed for state-mandated medical
malpractice coverage to raise to the level of a trade barrier. In actual
practice, it is the operation of an insurance system itself that adds
(Massachusetts court applied reciprocal punishments).
97 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2809(c) (2005). Such statutes in essence
invoke the Insurance Code.
98 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183-84 (1869) (upholding a Virginia law
regulating insurance companies). Cf. for a brief period in this country after United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the insurance trans-
actions were considered to be interstate commerce. See Susan Randall, Insurance
Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association
ofInsurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625, 633 (1998-1999).
99 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000). See also Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Rich-
ards, Health Care's "Thirty Years War": The Origins and Dissolution of Managed
Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 283, 308-10 (2004-2005) (discussing recent
Supreme Court cases impacting the determination of the business of health insur-
ance); Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A
Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL
MED. 443, 462-63 (1997) (discussing the determination of what constitutes the busi-
ness of health insurance).
100 However, because of the actions of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners "the content of insurance regulation evidences strong similarities
from state to state." Randall, supra note 98, at 629.101 Hwang, supra note 58, at 483-84.
102 Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Administrative Compensation
for Medical Malpractice Injuries: Reconciling the Brave New World of Patient Safety
and the Torts System, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 73 (2004) (mandating that providers pur-
chase medical malpractice coverage significantly increases health care transaction
costs because of system inefficiencies).
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something more to mandated insurance coverage and creates the po-
tential for trade barriers.
Conceptually, a state's insurance code regulates virtually every
aspect of the business of insurance within its boundaries. For example,
a state's insurance code extends from methods of actuarial analysis to
the size of reserves that must be held by an insurer. In the case of
health insurance, other aspects of an insurance code may even specify
whether physicians can be excluded from a managed care organiza-
tion's provider panel 10 3 and the benefits a patient must receive if the
insurer is to do business in the state. 10 4 The purpose of such compre-
hensive insurance regulation is, in part, consumer protection and, in
part, to provide the public with assurance that insurance carriers that
operate in a state are financially stable. 0 5 But, if compliance with the
insurance code is made too burdensome, large insurance carriers may
decline to enter a state's market and others may exit the state's mar-
ket. 10 6 Conversely, if a state wishes to nurture a home insurer it can
use its state insurance code to protect the carrier from out-of-state
competition. 10 7 Consequentially, if a state wanted to use mandated
telemedical malpractice coverage statutes as a trade barrier, it could
make the purchase of insurance unduly burdensome by making code
compliance difficult, thereby serving as a disincentive for carriers to
enter the market.
103 Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (upholding
a Kentucky law regulating insurance pools); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002) (holding that Illinois's HMO statute covering employee
welfare is not preempted by ERISA).
104 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (upholding a Massa-
chusetts statute against an insurer).
105 PAUL Guppy, WASH. POLICY CTR., WASHINGTON NEEDS AN APPOINTED
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER (1999), http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/Govt
Regulations/PBGuppyGRInsuranceCommissioner.html.
106 See Thomas R. McLean, Stealth v. Health: The Complexity of Tort Re-
form, 12 LEGAL MED. PERSP. (2003) (discussing how St. Paul Fire and Marine exited
the medical malpractice market business because the narrow profit margin associated
with providing such coverage no longer made sense). However, in truth, medical
malpractice carriers exit markets because of the insurance cycle and not necessarily
because of regulatory requirements. See Thomas R. McLean, Stealth v. Health: Revis-
iting Tort Reform, 14 LEGAL MED. PERSP. (2005), available at http://www.aclm.org/
publications/lmp/supplements/2005/julyaug2005_supplement.asp.
107 Kansas serves as an example. After recovering from the medical malprac-
tice crisis in the early 1980s, Kansas enacted a number of reforms. In particular, be-
cause the state medical society endorsed the formation of a mutual insurance carrier,
the state enacted specific legislation to create such an insurance company. Interview
with Larry Gill, Vice President, KaMMCO/MSC (Apr. 19, 2005) (citing KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-12a02-40-12a09 (2004)).
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Moreover, if a foreign telemedicine provider wishes to do busi-
ness in multiple states, the provider would need to be in compliance
with multiple insurance codes, which, not unlike multiple licensure
requirements, would act as a further trade barrier.10 8 To understand
this concept it must be realized that while there is much overlap be-
tween state insurance codes, each state's code has its own unique
definitions, coverage schemes, and procedures. Accordingly, for a
foreign telemedical provider to do business in all fifty states, the pro-
vider would have to hire a phalanx of insurance experts to deal with
the various nuances in state insurance law. This need for a phalanx of
insurance specialists to deal with multiple state insurance regulations
has, for almost two generations, been recognized as a barrier to oper-
ate a nationwide business. 10 9 Even before the issue of telemedical
malpractice was ever contemplated, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) was enacted precisely because national em-
ployers lobbied to have the trade barrier associated with complying
with multiple state insurance codes eliminated." 0
3. Professional Organizations
From a definitional point of view, professional organizations can-
not be trade barriers because they are not governmental regulators that
unduly impede certain market transactions. However, this section is
included here for completeness, as few individuals today doubt that
special interest groups are often the motivating force behind the en-
actment of protective regulations. Herein, recently articulated policies
of the American College of Radiology (ACR) and the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) are se-
lectively reviewed: ACR because of its hard-line support of trade bar-
riers (in the form of state licensure laws and mandated insurance) to
protect the domestic telemedicine market and JACHO because of a
change in its accreditation procedure concerning telemedicine provid-
108 Danielle F. Waterfield, Insurers Jump on Train for Federal Insurance
Regulation: Is It Really What They Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INs. L.J. 283, 304 (2002)
("Representatives from European insurance trade associations are urging U.S. 'state
lawmakers to become more active in [the] international forums that are setting the
ground rules for the new century of trade."').
109 See Thomas R McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability
for Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemp-
tion for State Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REv. 1, 5
(2001) ("President Ford signed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
[ERISA] to facilitate contracting for national employers by eliminating the need to
have to contemplate fifty different state laws.").
110 McLean & Richards, supra note 99, at 315.
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ers. While the positions of both of these organizations are driven, in
part, by the desire to preserve their place in the health care market-
place, both organizations may be unwittingly facilitating an invasion
of the U.S. health care market by foreign telemedicine providers.
a) ACR Recommendations
The ACR, which recognizes the inevitability of radiology jobs be-
ing offshored, advocates that existing laws governing medicine should
be enforced."' More specifically, because the ACR believes remote
physicians should be held to the same standards as on-site physicians,
the ACR's position is that providers of telemedicine are to be fully
licensed and in compliance with all of the local regulations, including
mandated insurance, that are relevant to the practice of medicine. 12 In
the ACR's view, the primary surveillance mechanism for hospitals is
the process of credentialing physicians,' 13 which is to include verifica-
tion of malpractice coverage. 14
Although the ACR's position is not unexpected, it has been rec-
ognized for some time that when a professional association, like the
ACR, espouses a position for ensuring the compliance with certain
minimal professional standards--even if such a position is superfi-
cially noble-such position statements often reflect the association's
perceived need for market protection legislation."1 5 Thus, because
obtaining and maintaining multiple state medical licenses is suffi-
111 Gerald C. Buffo & Sultan Ahamed, International Teleradiology: What Are
the Risks?, PHYSICIAN INSURER, Second Quarter 2005, at 13-16.
112 Arl Van Moore et al., Report of the ACR Task Force on International
Teleradiology, 2 J. AM. C. RADIOLOGY 121, 122-23 (2005). A discussion of the hard-
ware performance criteria for telemedicine systems promulgated by the ACR is be-
yond the scope of this article. For further information, see Am. C. of Radiology, ACR
Technical Standard for Teleradiology, TELERADIOLOGY, 2002, at 709-18, available at
http://www.unifesp.br/dis/set/disciplina/materialdeapoio/ACRTechnicalStandardfor
Teleradiology.pdf.
113 Van Moore et al., supra note 112, at 123.
114 Because various legal theories can be used to make a hospital answer for
the wrongs of physicians on the hospital's staff, hospitals may want to adopt this
recommendation. However, having remote physicians purchase medical malpractice
coverage may provide illusory protection because the remote physicians using the
Indian model are likely to be out of the reach of U.S. courts. See supra Part II.B.4.
115 See Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services 29-30 (Indian Council for
Research on Int'l Econ. Relations, Working Paper No. 70, Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.unctadindia.org/consultationontheframeworkWTOAgreementOfJuly2004
rupachanda02.pdf. "This distinction between a purely protectionist policy and a
public interest policy often depends on how the regulations are administered, whether
they are transparent in their criteria and use or whether they are used in a discretion-
ary and discriminatory manner." Id. at 33.
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ciently difficult to dissuade many individuals from obtaining them, it
is reasonable to conclude that the ACR's position is predicated on the
notion that the domestic teleradiology market needs protection from
low-wage overseas providers. Such a conclusion is reinforced by the
ACR's need to qualify its statement concerning compliance with state
licensure laws: "[P]hysicians who provide the official, authenticated
interpretation of images transmitted by teleradiology should maintain
licensure appropriate to delivery of radiologic services at both the
transmitting and receiving sites." ' 16 The ACR does not define equiva-
lent training but it is reasonable to conclude that in the ACR's view
equivalent training means full licensure plus board certification.' 17
Accordingly, because board certification is virtually only achievable
by attending approved residency programs, which are all located in
the United States, the ACR's use of "equivalent" training could, if
adopted as such, constitute a substantial trade barrier that would bene-
fit nighthawk telemedicine providers.
The problem with protecting the domestic radiology market with
trade barriers is that it is nearsighted. True, for a time full licensure
and insurance coverage requirements will dissuade Indian and perhaps
some nighthawk telemedical providers from operating nationwide.
Yet, what will the radiologist use to protect their market if America
moves to national licensure? Powerful forces in the form of the patient
safety movement' 18 and the liberalization of global trade policies un-
der international treaties"19 are inextricably moving America towards
national medical licensure, which will be analogous to a pilot's li-
cense. 120 Even the ACR's notion that hospital credentialing be used to
116 Van Moore et al., supra note 112, at 122 (internal reference omitted).
117 While not all practicing physicians have attained board certification,
market forces are increasingly forcing non-board certified physicians out of the
workplace. See, e.g., Geisinger Health Plan, Credentialing Standards, https://www.
thehealthplan.com/nonmembers/prospectcredentialing.cfm (last visited Dec. 19,
2005) (beginning in 2003, as a condition of employment, this health plan's policy
required that a physician had to be either board certified or eligible to take a board
examination).
118 See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 48.
"9 See infra Part III.F.
120 As with a federal pilot's license, the holder, subject to certain restrictions
of the specific license class, is free to fly anywhere in America. See Fed. Aviation
Admin., Flight Standards Service: How Do I Become a Pilot: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions (FAQ), http://www.faa.gov/AVR/afs/pilotfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006);
Ross Oliver, How to Become an Airline Pilot, http://www.airaffair.com/Library/start-
airplanes.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006); SoYouWanna Get a Pilot's License,
http://www.soyouwanna.com/site/syws/pilot/pilot.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
However, a detailed discussion of national pilot licensure is beyond the scope of this
article.
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verify licensure and proof of insurance seems overly trusting. Requir-
ing that hospitals oversee that physicians are in compliance with state
regulations is too ill-suited to stabilize and protect the health care
marketplace from future foreign invasion because obtaining jurisdic-
tion over remote providers, found after-the-fact not to be in compli-
ance, will be difficult at best and frequently impossible.
121
b) JCAHO
The ACR's recommendation that hospitals should use their cre-
dentialing process to verify a remote provider's licensure status is also
interesting in light of JCAHO's recent amendment to its hospital pol-
icy manual that liberalizes the standards for credentialing in telemedi-
cine. The JCAHO views telemedicine broadly, which includes any
electronic communication made for the purpose of improving patient
care, treatment, or services. 22 In the past, remote telemedical provid-
ers were credentialed by a hospital just as that hospital would have
credentialed any other physician. 123 However, in 2005, the JCAHO
amended its standards to allow for "credentialing . . . by proxy" in
telemedicine. 124 Under this amendment, when a hospital credentials a
telemedical provider by proxy, the hospital simply accepts an accred-
ited hospital's credentialing folder for a provider at face value, and
does not individually verify the information therein. 125 Although this
amendment is intended for use in emergent situations, credentialing
by proxy could potentially lower telemedical transaction costs by
eliminating redundant work. 126 After all, credentialing by proxy
eliminates the need for a second hospital to verify a provider's refer-
ences, education, and past employment. Yet, as experience is gained
with credentialing by proxy under emergent situations, if it proves
safe, credentialing by proxy will likely be applied more routinely
since it eliminates paper work and reduces transaction costs.
12 7
121 Van Moore et al., supra note 112, at 123-24 (ACR's own attorneys ac-
knowledge that obtaining jurisdiction over an individual in a non-criminal/non-capital
case is extremely difficult). A more detailed discussion of cyberspace jurisdiction can
be found infra Part II.B.4.
122 JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS. (JCAHO),
COMPREHENSIvE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS MS-29 (2005).
123 Id. at MS-30.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 For example, transaction costs would be reduced by eliminating redundant
clerical work. Discussion of the liability associated with negligently credentialing by
proxy is beyond the scope of this article.
127 Credentialing by proxy has a long way to go before it becomes main-
stream. For example, how does one assure that a provider's electronic credentialing
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4. Why Regulatory Protection of the Telemedicine Market Will Fail
For optimal efficiency, some markets need to be regulated.'28
Similarly, some markets need to be nurtured under protective trade
barriers to develop.' 29 But, when regulations are used as a permanent
trade barrier, economic history teaches that trade barriers have a lim-
ited life expectancy. 30 That is, trade barriers can only protect a market
for so long because the competition ultimately finds a way around the
barriers or a way to neutralize the barriers.' 3 ' That trade barriers have
a limited period of usefulness should be viewed with concern by the
medical community if we are going to protect our nascent domestic
telemedicine market by erecting trade barriers as recommended by the
ACR. In a truly global economy, it is free trade, and not trade barriers,
which is proven to "provide the richest benefits and highest efficiency
in a self-regulating global marketplace."' 132 Moreover, it is widely
believed today that if a nation wants to prosper, it must shift to a
global economy where trade barriers are increasingly becoming his-
torical footnotes. 133 Additionally, there is good reason to believe that
many nations will not be willing to allow the United States to protect
its domestic telemedical market via trade barriers for much longer.
folder is valid when 61 percent of complaints to the FTC about Internet transactions
concern fraud? See Lorene Yue, Web Fraud Dominates Consumer Complaints, CHI.
TRB., Mar. 20, 2005, §5, at 5.
128 See generally PARTNOY, supra note 67 (exploring stock market regula-
tion); STIGLITZ, supra note 68, at 87-88 (attributing current economic problems to
outdated ideologies followed in the 1990s); McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 66 (oil
industry-explaining how deregulation could have affected Enron's practices);
YERGIN, supra note 66 (oil industry regulation); and CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN (1992) (land speculation).
129 NOREENA HERTZ, THE DEBT THREAT: How DEBT IS DESTROYING THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 105 (2004) (observing that between the Civil War and the end of
World War II, no economy benefited as much from protective trade barriers as the
American economy).
130 McLean, supra note 42, at 522; Thomas R. McLean, Turf Wars: What Can
Modem Medicine Learn from Medieval Guilds?, 2005 AM. HEART Hosp. J. 269, 271.
1 With increasing technologic advancements, the time-effectiveness of trade
barriers is decreasing. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 45-48.
132 Ehrlich, supra note 10, at 265.
133 Id. at 264-65 (explaining how global free trade, and not preferential treat-
ment for domestic companies, is advantageous for all markets).
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a) Cyberspace Jurisdictional Theory' 34
In fact, two powerful legal-socioeconomic forces are already
poised to undermine state law-based trade barriers protecting tele-
medicine:13 1 jurisdictional realities and multilateral trade agreements.
Discussion of jurisdiction realities, in turn, can be further subdivided
into jurisdictional theory and jurisdictional practice in cyberspace.
State licensure laws are likely to mean little to many remote tele-
medicine providers because of the difficultly U.S. courts will have
asserting jurisdiction on remote foreign providers in their home coun-
tries. For a court in the United States to assert jurisdiction over a re-
mote telemedical provider, that court must have personal jurisdiction
over that provider to enforce its licensure and mandated insurance
laws. 136 Under a traditional civil procedure analysis of jurisdiction, to
have personal jurisdiction over a remote party, the court must be able
to demonstrate that the defendant had engaged in purposeful, "mini-
mum contacts" within its geographical boarders and there must be an
appropriate long-arm statute such that traditional notions of fair play
would not be upset by bringing a defendant into the court to answer
for alleged wrongdoing. 37 The demonstration of sufficient minimal
contracts and appropriate long-arm statute lies with the plaintiff.
138
Unfortunately, how this analysis applies in cyberspace is subject to
some speculation. In the world of telemedicine, in particular, there
does not yet appear to be a jurisdictional case on point,' 39 and when
telemedical jurisdiction has been discussed in the legal literature an
134 In the world of international trade-in-services, a service may be provided
by four separate methods known as modes. See infra Part III.D.2. Herein, the discus-
sion assumes that telemedicine is being provided as a Mode 1 service.
135 See McLean, supra note 1, 263-64.
136 See Jay Kesan, Learning Cyberlaw in Cyberspace: Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Brief Summary of Personal Jurisdiction Law (1999), http://www.cyber
spacelaw.org/kesan/kesanl.html. However, the forum court will have jurisdiction
over the local provider who took the patient's radiograph. Whether the local provider
has liability independent of the remote provider, e.g., on the basis of negligent selec-
tion of the remote provider, is beyond the scope of this article.
137 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). The medical
world has a fundamental misunderstanding of personal jurisdiction. See Van Moore et
al., supra note 112, at 123-24.
138 Hoag v. Sweetwater Int'l,, 857 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (D. Nev. 1994). To
simplify this discussion, it is assumed during the rest of this article that a proper long-
arm statute is in effect.
139 However, it is only a matter of time before these remote telemedicine
providers raise jurisdiction as a defense. One remote Indian telemedicine provider has
already been named as a defendant in an unreported medical malpractice suit. See
Stein, supra note 37, at A01 (a remote provider allegedly miscommunicated radio-
graph information to a U.S. emergency room physician).
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implicit assumption is made that only state, and not international,
boundaries are crossed.14
0
Perhaps the case that comes closest to addressing personal
jurisdiction issues in cyberspace is Bradley v. Mayo Foundation.141 In
this case, the Mayo Clinic, which does not have offices in the state of
Kentucky, found itself sued by Mr. Larry Bradley. 142 When Mr.
Bradley's local physician determined that he needed specialized
treatment, Mr. Bradley received a referral to Mayo Clinic. After
visiting the Clinic, a Mayo physician-employee coordinated Mr.
Bradley's outpatient drug treatment care in Kentucky, via telephone
and mail correspondence, with local providers. 43 When Mr. Bradley
experienced an unsatisfactory outcome from the Mayo Clinic
treatment protocol, he filed suit in a Kentucky court.' 44 To obtain
personal jurisdiction over the Clinic, Mr. Bradley asserted that
because of Mayo Clinic's physician's telephone and mail contact with
providers in Kentucky, sufficient minimal contacts existed between
the Mayo Clinic and Kentucky for personal jurisdiction.145 However,
after hearing the evidence, the Kentucky court disagreed and
dismissed the case. 146 Not only did the court not buy Mr. Bradley's
argument that the Mayo Clinic physician was practicing medicine in
Kentucky, 147 but the court went on to add:
Writing prescriptions, sending letters confirming diagnoses
previously made, and telephone consultations are routine ac-
tions taken by medical practitioners regardless of where their
patients are located. Such routine actions, when incidental to
treatment in the physician's home state, should not subject the
physician or his employer to jurisdiction in any state in which
his patient happens to reside. 1
48
140 McLean, supra note 1, at 247-49.
14' No. 97-204, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17505 (E.D. Ky.)..
142 Id. at *4-5.
143 Id. Cf. Some courts have concluded that a forum court does not have juris-
diction over an out of state provider if the patient travels to the remote provider's
place of business. Vance v. Molina, 28 P.3d 570, 574 (Okla. 2001). However, Bradley
is distinguishable from Vance because the out of state provider actively managed a
patient's care after the patient visited the out of state location.
'44 Bradley, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17505, at *4-8.
145 Id. at *7.
146 Id. at *22-23.
147 Id.
148 Id. at *27. More generally, in cyberspace, more than a passive webpage is
required to trigger personal jurisdiction in a remote forum. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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Most physicians reading this opinion would likely reach the oppo-
site conclusion because physicians would see the doctors at the Mayo
Clinic as practicing medicine in Kentucky, and therefore purposeful
minimal contacts would exist. After all, the Clinic's physicians were
supervising allied health professionals just as they frequently do in
Minnesota. Thus, in the future, this case will likely be viewed as fact-
specific; had Mayo Clinic advertised in Kentucky or had one of its
physicians staffed a clinic in Kentucky the case might have come to a
different conclusion. On the other hand, what is important about this
case is that because the Kentucky court would not assert personal ju-
risdiction against a Minnesota provider giving orders over the tele-
phone to allied health professionals, it is unlikely the Kentucky court
would find personal jurisdiction over a foreign telemedical provider
who provided care in association with local allied health professionals
via video teleconferencing, especially if first contacted by the Ken-
tucky citizen.
This case also illustrates an important point about cyberspace ju-
risdiction. If one attempts to apply the traditional physical world
model of jurisdiction to a remote international telemedicine provider,
the traditional model is placed under strain. And this strain is not lim-
ited to issues of jurisdiction. For example, in a case of alleged cyber-
malpractice: in which country would the telemedicine tort have been
committed, which country's laws should apply, and which country
gets to decide these issues?
The source of the stain in cyberspace jurisdictional analysis can
be traced to the traditional jurisdiction model being predicated on ge-
ography. Known as the "effects doctrine," 149 jurisdiction based on
geography exists "if an activity takes place within a territory, that ter-
ritory has the jurisdiction to create laws to regulate the activity. ' 150
Unfortunately, in cyberspace, and on the Internet in particular, where
geographic boundaries are nonexistent, traditional notions of jurisdic-
tion tend to break down.' 51 Moreover, not only is geography-based
jurisdiction hard to apply in cyberspace, but the problem is unlikely to
be resolved soon as different proposals concerning effects doctrine
jurisdiction have been advanced by the United States 152 and the Euro-
pean Union. 1
53
149 Catherine P. Heaven, A Proposal for Removing Road Blocks from the
Information Superhighway By Using an Integrated International Approach to Internet
Jurisdiction, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 373, 377-78 (2001).
... Id. at 378.
' Id. at 377.
152 See, e.g., Laura Ann Forbes, Comment, A More Convenient Crime: Why
States Must Regulate Internet-Related Criminal Activity under the Dormant Coin-
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Perhaps a better solution to cyberspace jurisdiction is to abandon
the notion that such jurisdiction needs to be grounded in geography.
Using the Outer Space Treaty 154 as a guide post, cyberspace could be
analogized to outer space, which is considered international territory.
Under the Outer Space Treaty, which is an expansion of the Law of
the Sea, jurisdiction is imposed based on nationality and not on geo-
graphic location.1 55 Under this model of jurisdiction, the person who
creates or controls the telemedical equipment attaches his or her na-
tionality to the operation so as to create a virtual cyber island in cy-
berspace, "much like how flags created an island of jurisdiction for
ships at the beginning of the development of the Law of the Sea."'
56
Accordingly, under nationality based jurisdiction of international
spaces, the home country of the person whose nationality attached to
the telemedical operation would become the forum jurisdiction for
policing the telemedical operation.
57
However, if the Outer Space Treaty becomes the model for cyber-
space jurisdiction it would significantly undermine the ability of states
to erect trade barriers to protect their domestic telemedicine market.
This is because under the Outer Space treaty, only the law of the home
nation, and not the states or provinces of a nation, would attach. Ac-
cordingly, under the Outer Space Treaty jurisdiction, the laws of a
state would have little import as only federal law would attach to the
domestic telemedical operation.'
58
b) Cyberspace Jurisdictional Practice
Even if the law for determining jurisdiction in cyberspace were
settled, there is still the practical matter of serving notice on the re-
mote telemedical provider. Under traditional notions of fairness, de-
fendants are entitled to receive notice from a court that is planning to
assert jurisdiction over the defendant or the defendant's property. Ac-
cordingly, in the United States, statutes are in place at both the state
and federal levels detailing service of process on foreign defen-
merce Clause, 20 PACE L. REV. 189 (1999).
153 See, e.g., Globalisation and the Information Society, A4-0366/98, at 7
(Jan. 14, 1999), http://en.infosoc.gr/content/downloads/com9850en.pdf.
154 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S.-U.K.-
U.S.S.R., Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410.
155 Heaven, supra note 149, at 390. This article deals primarily with criminal
law jurisdiction.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 395.
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dants. 159 Massachusetts, for example, requires that service of process
on a foreign defendant is via legal rogatory or a non-binding letter
from the state court to a foreign court requesting a subject to be
served. 60 But unless the matter is a capital criminal offense, a foreign
court is not likely to have much of an incentive to serve process on its
own citizen, especially if that citizen is a telemedical provider bring-
ing in a substantial amount of U.S. health care dollars.' 6' Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service on an individual in a foreign
country must be by rogatory or in accordance with international
law. 62 While international law may facilitate federal service in an-
other country, use of international law invites recognition of other
international laws, such as the GATS and NAFTA treaties. This, as
we shall see in the next Part of this article, opens a whole new "can of
worms" for the domestic telemedical marketplace.
But even if the issue with both the jurisdictional and service of
process were suddenly resolved, there is one other practical concern
with getting foreign telemedical providers to answer for the harms
they cause. It is one thing to mandate that telemedical providers carry
medical malpractice coverage and an entirely different thing to get a
medical malpractice carrier to perform on the insurance contract
because of exculpatory clauses. Potentially, such clauses could be
drafted in a number of ways to protect insurers from exposure in the
telemedical arena, including exclusion of coverage for non-physician-
to-patient interaction and providing excessively risky consultative
services. 63 Of particular interest is the use of exculpatory clauses that
159 The discussion that follows assumes that the named defendant does not
have a registered agent in the United States, which would greatly facilitate process
serving. However, even with a registered agent, a remote provider may not necessar-
ily cooperate if that provider has either a minimal share of the telemedicine market or
lives in a country that is prepared to intervene on the provider's behalf. See supra Part
II.B.4.
160 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 6(a)(4) (West 2000). A rogatory
letter, or a letter of request, is a formal letter by state court to a court in a foreign
jurisdiction requesting that an individual be served. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 916
(7th ed. 1999).
161 The attorneys for the American College of Radiology have opined that in
non-capital criminal cases, bringing a defendant to justice in the United States is very
difficult. See Buffo & Ahamed, supra note 111, at 15; and Van Moore et al., supra
note 112, at 123.
162 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
163 Sultan Ahamed, President & Chairman, Conn. Med. Ins. Co. Malpractice
Insurance Coverage and Telehealth, Speech at the 28th Annual Meeting of the Physi-
cians Insurers Association of America (May 25-28, 2005). Not all malpractice poli-
cies cover telemedical services, and when telemedicine is covered, exculpatory
clauses are the rule. Id. Moreover, medical malpractice policies generally do not
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require a physician-defendant to participate in their defense.' 64
Although these clauses are common in medical malpractice contracts,
currently, they are rarely used. Still, because from time-to-time an
insurer will elect to enforce this clause, 165 it seems probable that such
exculpatory clauses will see more use in the era of international
telemedicine.
Imagine a hypothetical situation in which a remote foreign
provider is named as defendant in a medical malpractice.1 66 Assuming
that process is properly served, after obtaining the advice of local
counsel in the provider's home country, the provider concludes that
even if a U.S. court assets jurisdiction, there is little likelihood that
any judgment will be enforced. Accordingly, the remote foreign
provider elects to ignore the summons, and refuses to cooperate
further with the judicial proceedings. After a default judgment is
entered, the plaintiff attempts to collect from the telemedicine
provider's medical malpractice carrier. At this point the malpractice
carrier would play the exculpatory trump card. 167 Because the
physician did not cooperate, the insurer is under no duty to perform
under the insurance contract.
Such an analysis suggests that telemedicine providers using the
Indian model, as well as their insurers, face little in the way of liabil-
cover a physician's activities where the physician does not have a valid license. W.
Governors' Ass'n, Telemedicine Action Update (1998), http://www.westgov.org/wga/
publicat/combar4.htm.
164 For example, the standard indemnity contract of one medical malpractice
carrier contains the following clause: "The Insured and each of its employees shall
cooperate with the Company and, upon the Company's request, assist in making set-
tlements, in the conduct of suits and in enforcing any right of contribution or indem-
nity against any person or organization who may be liable to the Insured because of
injury or damages with respect to which insurance is afforded under this policy; and
the Insured, and any of its members, partners, officers, directors, stockholders and
employees that the Company deems necessary, shall attend hearings and trials and
assist in securing and giving evidence and obtaining the attendance of witnesses."
Interview with Larry Gill, supra note 107.
165 Id.
166 As used here, "provider" refers to a physician. Because of both personal
jurisdiction concerns and the multiple legal theories that may be used to find corpo-
rate liability, e.g., ostensible agency and respondent superior liability, the analysis of
corporate liability quickly becomes complex. Therefore, a detailed discussion of
corporate liability is beyond the scope of this article.
167 For this hypothetical it is assumed that the medical malpractice carrier's
place of business is in the same jurisdiction as the plaintiff who is injured. A more
complex analysis of the malpractice carrier's liability would be required if the insurer
was a foreign corporation such as Lloyds of London. A detailed discussion of mal-
practice coverage provided by foreign corporations is beyond the scope of this article.
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ity for telemedicine malpractice. 168 Therefore, not only will Indian
model providers be able to undercut American providers because of
the use of low-wage physician labor force, Indian model providers
will also be able to undercut all providers because of their greater abil-
ity to go without insurance coverage. How long this anomalous situa-
tion is tolerated is subject to speculation.
III. REMOVING TRADE BARRIERS: NAFTA AND
GATS
While parties in remote countries can settle their personal jurisdic-
tional and insurance contract disputes through individual litigation,
from a societal point of view, individual litigation is inefficient be-
cause it requires continuous reinvention of the wheel. For society, a
more efficient system would be one where the rules of jurisdiction and
liability were transparent, such that they did not have to be elucidated
on a case-by-case basis, thereby streamlining litigation. 69 More gen-
erally, international telemedicine litigation could be made more effi-
cient if the rules of jurisdiction and commerce were recognized by
parties on both sides of the ocean.
Historically, the rules of transoceanic/transnational commerce
were standardized by international trade treaties. In the health care
arena, both GATS and NAFTA contemplate regulation of transoce-
anic medical commerce.1 70 Interestingly, Canada is taking a leading
position in the debate on the impact of GATS and NAFTA, perhaps
out of economic fear of its neighbor to the south. 171 And while both of
these treaties may ultimately be modified to accommodate the nu-
ances of transoceanic telemedicine, it is unlikely that basic principles
underlying these treaties will be revised. 172 Accordingly, if we are to
168 See also Interview with Edward P. Richard, Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University (Apr. 22, 2005) ("If the doc refuses to defend at all, the insurer is
probably not going to have to pay.").
169 See Leah B. Mendelsohn, Comment, A Piece of the Puzzle: Telemedicine
as an Instrument to Facilitate the Improvement of Healthcare in Developing Coun-
tries?, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 151, 168 (2004) ("Currently, technology has advanced
faster than the law, and, thus, there are no international treaties or global agreements
about telemedicine."). See also McLean, supra note 1, 247-54.
170 Under GATS, health care services are to be viewed broadly. GATS, supra
note 11, art. 1.3.
171 See JIM GRIESHABER-OTTO & ScoTT SINCLAIR, BAD MEDICINE: TRADE
TREATIES, PRIVATIZATION AND HEALTH CARE REFORM IN CANADA 9-10 (2004) (dis-
cussing "whether private financing and for-profit delivery of health care should play a
greater role in Canada"); Blum, supra note 39, at 92.
172 Trade treaties that specifically involve the telecommunication industry,
including some part of GATS, specifically the 1997 Telecommunication Annex, and
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understand the future of international telemedicine, it is necessary to
have a clearer understanding of what GATS and NAFTA have in
common, how they are significantly different, and just what they have
to say about the jurisdiction and the insurance industry in a global
marketplace.
A. A Brief History of Multilateral Service Treaties
Before launching into the specifics of the GATS and NAFTA
treaties, a brief overview of the history of multilateral treaties is ap-
propriate to provide orientation and perspective. 173 Prior to the twenti-
eth century, trade conflicts between nations were largely resolved on
the basis of colonial "gun-boat diplomacy"-i.e., the government with
the strongest military imposed its will on weaker nations and private
parties. 17 Under gun-boat diplomacy, which was outlawed by the
U.N. Charter,' 75 the concept of "might makes right" prevailed and
private parties lacked standing under such international law to chal-
lenge the authority of sovereign nations to promulgate a trade pol-
icy.' 76 But these notions changed with the rise of transoceanic com-
merce after World War 11.177
GATS, the older of the two treaties under review here, represents
a refinement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which was focused on trade-in-goods.1 78 GATT, originally signed in
1948, did not anticipate the explosion of trade-in-services that was to
characterize global commerce at the end of the last century. 79 Ac-
cordingly, to eliminate many of the distortions in the service sector
NAFTA, are relevant here, but are beyond the scope of this article.
173 The analysis of the impact of trade treaties concerning telemedicine of-
fered here is substantially different than provided by Blum. Blum, supra note 39. In
his seminal article on telemedicine and trade treaties, Professor Blum divided interna-
tional law that affects telemedicine into public international law, international law-
making bodies, private international law, and privacy law. Id. The current article deals
primarily with the first of these subdivisions, and less with other subdivisions.
174 Matthew B. Cobb, Comment, The Development of Arbitration in Foreign
Investment, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Apr. 2001, at 48, 49.
175 id.
176 Id.
177 Such rules for trade-in-services tend to discourage private investment in
foreign countries. See Ray C. Jones, Note, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dis-
pute Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 BYU L.
REv. 527, 528.
178 See Ian S. Mutchnick et al., Trading Health Services across Borders:
GATS, Markets, and Caveats, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 25, 2005, http://content.health
affairs.or /cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.42/DC 1.
17 Id. Between 1980 and 2000 the volume of international trade in commer-
cial services increased 400 percent; from $364 billion to $1.4 trillion. Id.
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that were created as unintended consequences of GATT, this treaty
was supplanted in 1994, during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
tions, by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). De-
signed to be both a forum to further trade negotiations and a forum for
the adjudication of trade disputes,18 0 the WTO has attracted most of
the world's nations as members. GATS, in turn, is the fundamental
document controlling the operation and scope of the WTO's member-
nations rights and relationships.
The scope of GATS is broad and covers all measures that "affect"
trade-in-services.'8s However, GATS specifically excludes from cov-
erage services provided in the "exercise of governmental authority,"
which are services that have neither a commercial nor a competitive
basis.1 2 But this loophole is not wide enough to allow either the
United States or Canada to shelter their respective governmental in-
volvement in the medical sectors of their economies from the reach of
GATS.18 3 Conversely, this exception could become important if the
United States were to adopt a government-run single-payor health
care system as has been suggested by the Institute of Medicine
(IOM)18 4 and supported by economic analysis. 8 5
NAFTA, on the other hand, which was also signed into existence
in the early 1990s, was negotiated by President George H. W. Bush
under rules of "fast track" authority. 8 6 Rather than creating a global
trade organization, NAFTA creates a trading block between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico by removing impediments to
commerce across the borders of these countries. In terms of stimulat-
ing trade, NAFTA is an unqualified success. 187 Critics of NAFTA,
however, have argued that because of its notorious investor-to-state
180 Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 44-49 (2005). Under both GATS and NAFTA, trade
disputes are to be resolved via arbitrations. Jones, supra note 177, at 534-36 (detailing
the NAFTA arbitration procedure).
181 GATS, supra note 11, art. 1.1.
182 Id. art. 1.3.
183 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 25.
184 INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2004).
185 See David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Mayhem in the Medi-
cal Marketplace, MONTHLY REV., Dec. 2004, available at http://www.monthlyreview.
org/1204himmelstein.htm.
186 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 104-418,
102 Stat. 1129 (1988). Briefly, "fast track" authority limits the ability of Congress to
modify terms of a treaty negotiated under this act. Id.
187 By 1998, "the total three-way trade among Canada, Mexico, and the
United States [in the first five years] reached approximately $752 billion." Jones,
supra note 177, at 527.
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clause, which provides individuals with a private cause of action
against national governments, NAFTA should not be considered a
trade agreement, but rather an investment agreement. 188
B. General Structure of Treaties and their Impact on Medicine
As a general rule, both GATS and NAFTA are top-down treaties,
which means that unless there is a specific provision to the contrary,
provisions in these treaties cover all aspects of the service sector of a
WTO member-nation's economy.189 Both of these treaties also have
mechanisms to ensure that trade-in-services are liberalized with
time. ' 90 That is, under both GATS and NAFTA, trade-in-services laws
and regulations are to move progressively toward free trade-in-
services, as characterized by the absence of trade barriers. Under
GATS, members of the WTO are expected to lower trade barriers for
services during each round of trade negotiations.' 91 In contrast, under
NAFTA, trade barriers that were in existence prior to 1994 may re-
main. However, NAFTA liberalizes trade-in-services by directing that
trade barriers in existence cannot be made more onerous' 92 and that if
a NAFTA inconsistent regulation is amended, the amendment must be
made more NAFTA consistent, which means the trade barriers are to
be made less restrictive. 193
GATS and NAFTA apply to virtually all medical services world-
wide. This is because, contrary to popular belief, most health services
worldwide are privately funded' 94 and not subject to general exclusion
for governmental services. Because most nations cannot protect their
health care sectors from the liberalizing effects of GATS and NAFTA
indefinitely, these treaties will have a tendency to open up health care
markets, including the trillion-dollar U.S. market, 195 to global compe-
188 Pub. Citizen, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), http://
www.citizen.org/trade/nafta (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
189 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 23. However, some
caveats exist: under GATS there are several bottom up-clauses, which apply only to
specific industries. Id. Additionally, under both GATS and NAFTA, there are mecha-
nisms for opting out so that a country can protect specific industries. See id. A de-
tailed discussion on the strategies that a nation might use to protect a service or in-
vestment industry is beyond the scope of this article.
190 As will be demonstrated in the ensuing sections, many of the specific
clauses of GATS and NAFTA reinforce the notion that trade barriers are to be elimi-
nated to facilitate free trade.
191 GATS, supra note 11, arts. XIX-XXI.
192 See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1202.
'9' id. at art. 1206.
194 Mutchnick et al., supra note 178.
195 See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE NEW NEW THING: A SILICON VALLEY STORY 99
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tition. If a nation allows its states or provinces to erect trade barriers to
protect a local health care market, that nation exposes itself to the
imposition of various trade sanctions. In fact, considering that the
United States has already benefited from membership in the WTO and
NAFTA, it is somewhat surprising that other members of the world
trade community have not been more vocal in their petitioning to en-
ter into the U.S. domestic telemedical market.
C. Clauses Common to GATS and NAFTA
GATS and NAFTA contain several common clauses, including
clauses covering Most Favored Nation (MFN) and National Treatment
(NT) status, Public Monopolies and State Enterprises, Government
Procurement, and Intellectual Property. 9
6
1. MFN & NT Clauses
GATS and NAFTA, for the first time in history of international
law, articulate the principle that discrimination on the basis of nation-
ality is not tolerated.1 97 The primary mechanisms by which GATS and
NAFTA advance this principle of non-discrimination is through the
MFN and NT clauses. The MFN clause is a "favor one, favor all"
clause that requires WTO members to give the best trade-in-service
terms offered to one country to all countries. 98 The NT clause, on the
other hand, requires member-nations of GATS and NAFTA to bestow
the same regulatory treatment on foreign services providers that they
bestow on their domestic service providers. 99 In fact, under NAFTA,
the NT clause guarantees that corporations in member-nations do not
have to relocate their operations or employees to have access to the
markets of other member-nations. 200 The MFN and NT clauses apply
not only to explicit discrimination based on nationality, but also to
regulations that seem neutrally-worded, yet in practice result in dis-
crimination. 201 Accordingly, even if a regulation is nationality-neutral
(2000).
196 Because the government procurement aspects of these treaties are not
currently applicable to the health care sector and discussion of international intellec-
tual property is beyond the scope of this article, these clauses will not be considered
further.
197 Id. at 25.
198 GATS, supra note 11, art. II. See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1203.
199 GATS, supra note 11, art. XVII. See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1202.
Under GATS, national treatment only applies to listed services. Id.
200 Key NAFTA Sector-Specific Provisions, http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/
3002.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
201 Under GATS, application of the National Treatment clause is complicated
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on its face, if in actual application of the regulation foreign services
providers are discriminated against because of their nationality, then
such a clause violates both GATS and NAFTA.2 °2
Further, although both GATS and NAFTA recognized that mem-
ber nations have the right to police their economies, the MFN and NT
clauses of these multilateral treaties place limits on the extent to
which member-nations can exercise their economic regulatory author-
ity.203 So, while it is true that. under GATS and NAFTA member-
nations are free to exercise "any necessary disciplines" to ensure and
enforce licensure, certification, and technical standards in services,
these market disciplinary measures may not be "more burdensome
than necessary to ensure the quality of the service. ' 2° Implicit here is
the concept that licensure should not be used as a trade barrier and
that the process for licensure determination must be transparent so as
to ensure that licensure does not turn on some form of unintentional
national discrimination. In sum, the cumulative effect of the MFN and
NT clauses is that state and federal governmental agencies may not
regulate the health care market by: (1) CONs, (2) rationing the num-
ber of professional licenses issued, or (3) capping the total value of
health care services reimbursed, because each of these regulations
establishes quotas that could indirectly favor one nation over another
in the marketplace.2 °5
In commenting on the implication of MFN and NT clauses for the
health care sector, international law attorney Mathew Yeo observed
that the United States will have a hard time arguing for further libera-
tion of trade barriers until it cleans its own house and simplifies, if not
eliminates, the matrix of state law regulations.20 6 Thus, what Mr. Yeo
is suggesting is that the United States will not reap further economic
benefits under GATS and NAFTA, unless America moves its health
by the way the service is provided; i.e., the service's mode type. See infra Part III.D.2.
202 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 25-26.
203 See, e.g., GATS, supra note 11, art. X1V (noting that nothing in this treaty
is to be used to prevent a member country from adopting or enforcing necessary
measures "to protect human, animal or plant life or health"); and Debra J. Lipson,
GATS and Trade in Health Insurance Services: Background Note for WHO Comm 'n
on Macroeconomics and Health 3 (Commission on Macroeconomics & Health,
Working Paper No. WG 4:7, June 2001), available at http://www.cmhealth.org/
docs/wg4paper7.pdf (observing that the use of the health exception clause to regu-
late the medical sector of a nation's economy will be subject to a narrow interpreta-
tion of what is "necessary" to protect health).
204 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 31 (citation omitted).
205 Id. at 30.
206 Yeo, supra note 60. There is little question that U.S. corporations want to
benefit from GATS and NAFTA and expand into the economies of other nations. See
generally HERTZ, supra note 129.
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care system toward a national medical licensure system that does not
discriminate against foreign providers.2 °7 Supplanting a system of
state medical licensure with a single national system would, of course,
eliminate the primary trade barrier protecting the U.S. domestic tele-
medicine market. Given that access to the telemedicine market is not
limited by capital requirements, a remote telemedical provider with a
national medical license would be free to compete for patients in the
lucrative U.S. health care market. Moreover, if the remote provider
uses the Indian model for telemedicine delivery, which is character-
ized by its low-wage providers and diminished concern for medical
malpractice liability, such a remote provider will likely provide un-
precedented price-cutting competition.
2. Public Monopolies and State Enterprises
In addition to the MFN and NT clauses, GATS and NAFTA both
208contain clauses that limit public monopolies and state enterprises.
These provisions prevent the governments of member-nations from
moving into a sector of their economy and establishing a monopoly
under the government exclusion clause in order to gain economic
leverage or protect an industry from foreign competition.20 9 Under
both treaties, the primary enforcement mechanism behind the public
monopolies and state enterprise clauses is the need to provide
compensation. Under GATS, a nation that sets up an abusive
governmental enterprise for the purpose of market domination must
either compensate a foreign service provider for their loss of market
share or face economic retaliation from the foreign services provider's
home nation.210 Under NAFTA, if a member-nation sets up an abusive
governmental enterprise or monopoly, any foreign provider whose
investments are impaired has a private right of action against the
abusing government.2 1
At present, perhaps the major concern of the application of the
public monopolies and state enterprises is how these clauses will be
207 Yeo, supra note 60. Professor Yeo observes that even if the issue of board
certification is administered even handedly, it could be used as part of a regulator
scheme in lieu of licensure. See id. However, in its present form, board certification is
a not a workable alternative to national licensure because board certification in the
United States requires completion of a U.S. residency. Thus, board certification indi-
rectly discriminates against some providers and will therefore be inconsistent with the
national treatment clauses of GATS and NAFTA.
208 GATS, supra note 11, art. VIII; NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1502 & 1503.
209 Grieshaber-Otto & Sinclair, supra note 171, at 27.
210 Id.
211 See the discussion of investor-state compensation infra Part III.E.3.
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interpreted. Thus far, neither GATS nor NAFTA has had an arbitra-
tion action concerning these clauses. Conceptually, however, expand-
ing the public health sector of a member-nation's economy, which has
arguably occurred in the United States with the passage of the Medi-
care Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
(MMA),212 could trigger compensation claims by foreign providers. In
addition, it is an open question whether a nation can, as Canada ap-
pears to have done, expand its telemedical capacity under the guise of
its public health department, 213 and still remain consistent with the
GATS and NAFTA provisions regarding public monopolies and state
enterprises.
D. Clauses Unique to GATS
1. Market Access and Domestic Regulations Restrictions
GATS contains three unique clauses that place restrictions on
market access, 214 domestic regulations, 215 and trade operations. 216 In
fact, so unique is the market access restrictions clause that it is not
found in any other multilateral treaty.2t 7 The market access restric-
tions clause prohibits WTO member-nations from capping: (1) the
number of suppliers, (2) the value of transactions, or (3) the number of
persons employed in any service.218 Consistent with other provisions
in GATS, the market access restrictions clause not only applies to
"numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test, ' '219
but is also applicable to any monopoly or exclusive service provider
agreements that are inconsistent with GATS. 220 Thus, if the United
States should ever commit its health care services sector to trade un-
der GATS, the market access restrictions clause would prohibit any
state from limiting the number of providers doing business in its bor-
ders or establishing health care spending caps.221 As the market access
212 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
213 McLean, supra note 1, at 261-62.
214 GATS, supra note 11, art. XVI.
215 Id. at art. VI.4.
216 See infra Part III.D.2.
217 GRIESHABER-OTrO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 30.
218 Id. at 29.
219 GATS, supra note 11, art. XVI. This clause is applicable regardless of
mode of commerce or sector of the economy. Id.
220 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 29.
221 Id. The concept of committing a sector of an economy to trade-in-services
will be developed in the next section.
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restrictions clause is framed in absolute terms, this clause actually
imposes a greater degree of restriction on the ability of a government
to regulate its economy than does GATS's MFN and NT provi-
sions.222 In short, the market access restrictions clause of GATS could
someday be used as powerful leverage to open the domestic telemedi-
cine market to foreign competition.
Similarly, the proposed domestic restrictions clause is of concern
to the future of telemedicine because under this clause any licensing,
certification, and technical standards imposed by a nation on a
particular sector of its economy must not be "more burdensome than
necessary to ensure the quality of the service. 22 3 Several existing
forms of health care regulations could potentially run afoul of this
clause, including: (1) obligations on providers to accept all patients,
(2) limitations on fees so that access to health care is available to all,
and (3) disciplining providers with licensure revocation rather than
using a scheme that fines or publishes wrong-doers' names in public
forums.22 4 In short, if GATS's domestic restrictions clause should ever
become applicable to the U.S. health care sector, this clause could
seriously undermine the authority of state boards of medical
examiners by limiting the ability of these governmental agencies to
adjudicate and discipline provider's quality of care and professional
conduct.
2. Operational Clause: Commitments and Modes
225
Despite the broad wording of GATS, its provisions for free trade
are not applicable to a member-nation's entire economy.226 Rather,
GATS only attaches to certain sectors of a member-nation's economy,
depending on that country's commitments and the mode of commerce
.227 Gof the particular service. Under GATS, the purpose of a commit-
ment is to provide foreign investors in a country's economy with a
legally enforceable guarantee that a member's economy is stable and
predictable with respect to market conditions in a particular sector.228
222 See id. at 26.
223 GATS, supra note 11, art. VI.4.
224 Grieshaber-Otto & Sinclair, supra note 171, at 31.
225 This section is intended to provide an overview of GATS' commitments
and modes. Because of the details involved, this material quickly becomes complex.
Accordingly, the reader is advised that this section is not a substitute for a more for-
mal study of the relevant sections of GATS.
22 Lipson, supra note 203, at 3 (providing that there is an exemption clause
for health reasons).
227 Id. at 2-3.
228 Id. at 3.
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Thus, if a WTO member-nation makes a commitment to trade in a
particular service, that country is obligated to (1) administer its do-
mestic economic regulations in a "reasonable, objective and impartial
manner;" (2) provide "adequate procedures to verify the competence
of professionals of any other Member;" and (3) conform its regula-
tions to common "international standards" for services.229 In some
cases a commitment is given by a country in the belief that the com-
mitment will improve a member's economy, whereas in other cases a
country gives a commitment because leverage is applied to that coun-
try, e.g., debt cancellation, to open its market.230 Thus far, eighty-eight
WTO members have made some commitment on behalf of their health
and dental sector.23'
But even if a country commits its health care sector that does not
necessarily mean the country has opened its borders to foreign provid-
ers regardless of trade mode. Under GATS, each sector of a nation's
economy is further subdivided into modes based on how a particular
service is supplied.232 There are four supply modes based on the geo-
graphic relationship between the service supplier and consumer.
When a nation commits a sector of its economy under GATS, that
nation may only make a commitment for a particular mode. Accord-
ingly, the mode by which a service is supplied is a non-trivial matter
under GATS because different aspects of a sector of a nation's econ-
omy-like health care-may receive different degrees of commitment
depending on the mode of the service's delivery.
a) Mode 1
Services supplied by Mode 1 are services that are provided over
international borders.233 That is, under Mode 1, a service is provided
by a supplier in one country to a purchaser in another country. Inter-
national telemedicine is most frequently classified as a Mode 1 ser-
vice.234 A characteristic of Mode 1 services is "the absence of [a]
regulatory framework[ ] . . . " for insurance, including medical mal-
practice, confidentiality, and payment. 235 This lack of regulation is
229 GATS, supra note 11, art. VI.
230 See generally HERTZ, supra note 129.
231 WHO INDIA REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
232 A detailed discussion of the regulation of global commerce in services
based on mode of supply is beyond the scope of this article.
233 Lipson, supra note 203, at 2.
234 GRIESHABER-OrO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 117 (stating that elec-
tronic transactions are equivalent to face-to-face transactions). See Yeo, supra note
60.
235 Chanda, supra note 115, at 3 1.
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interesting considering that Mode 1 transference of health services is
already a multiple-billion dollar industry.236 However, the regulatory
anarchy associated with Mode 1 is unlikely to remain much longer
because more systematic regulations would eliminate a substantial
amount of uncertainty in the market, just as regulations of the oil in-
dustry help stabilize the market by eliminating a substantial amount of
uncertainty in the market.
b) Mode 2
Services supplied under Mode 2 are services that are consumed
while a person is abroad.237 For example, had GATS been in effect
when Europeans and Arabs traveled to Houston to undergo cardiac
surgery in the 1960s and 1970s,238 consumption of the cardiac services
would have been classified under Mode 2. Although in 1998 the mar-
ket for the supply of health care services under Mode 2 was estimated
to be $1.2 billion,239 as international telemedicine becomes more
commonplace in the future, the market for Mode 2 health care ser-
vices is likely to contract. The convenience of telemedicine will obvi-
ate the need for patients to travel abroad to obtain specialized health
care. After all, improving access to health care specialists is a major
selling point for telemedicine. Accordingly, in the future it is likely
that the only persons purchasing health care under Mode 2 will be
those traveling abroad on business or holiday that have the misfortune
of becoming ill.
c) Mode 3
Mode 3 services are the converse of Mode 2: Rather than have the
consumer traveling to receive a service, under Mode 3, suppliers set
up a commercial presence in a foreign country. 24° To date, most WTO
members who have made health care related commitments have done
so under Mode 3 .241 Thus, Mode 3 has become the preferred mode by
which major players in the health and life insurance markets have
236 The size of a single contract for telemedical services can be staggering.
For example, the United Kingdom's NHS ten-year contract for electronic medical
records management was deemed to be worth £5.5 billion. GRIESHABER-OrrO &
SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 102.
237 Lipson, supra note 203, at 2.
238 See generally THOMAS THOMPSON, HEARTS; OF SURGEONS AND
TRANSPLANTS, MIRACLES AND DISASTERS ALONG THE CARDIAC FRONTIER (1971).
239 Chanda, supra note 60, at 58.
240 Lipson, supra note 203, at 2.
241 Mutchnick et al., supra note 178.
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expanded abroad.242 In the clinical arena, to provide better service for
its Arab clientele, the Mayo Clinic recently opened an office in Du-
bai.243 But as with Mode 2 provided health care services, as telemedi-
cine services become more commonplace, fewer physicians will need
to be deployed to remote locations. In part, few physicians will be
relocated because of the costs involved, especially if telemedicine
proves more cost-effective, and in part because the host nation will
want to see its own physicians employed.
For institutional providers, the future is less clear. As greater
commercial presence by the insurance industry is established in for-
eign countries, the demand for Mode 1 telemedical services and Mode
3 franchised medical services is likely to increase because a robust
insurance market fosters the growth of the medical services market.2"
In fact, because franchised health care expansion under GATS's Mode
3 is an extension of the traditional business model of the "bricks and
mortar" age to expand a health care operation, Mode 3 health care
expansion will remain for the foreseeable future as a significant threat
to telemedical growth. Not only is a franchise business structure more
familiar to the business communities worldwide, it is probably safe to
say that at present, most patients, when given the choice, would elect
to shake hands with a physician than turn on a television set and
merely see the physician.
Also, under Mode 3, WTO members retain a wide-scope of regu-
latory control over their private health insurance market.245 Members
may define minimum benefit packages and may, under certain cir-
cumstances, exclude some foreign insurers despite commitments to
242 Lipson, supra note 203, at 4.
243 Mayo Clinic in Dubai Opens, http://www.ameinfo.com/58634 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2006). See also Brenda J. Buote, When Bigger Isn't Better: Community Hos-
pitals Offering Specialty Care to Compete with Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 2005,
at 1 (providing that if quality is not an issue, patients prefer to receive health care
from local providers).
244 Mutchnick et al., supra note 178. Since the enactment of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999), which allowed for
increased competition in providing financial services between insurers and national
banks, insurers have increasingly been interested in expanding abroad. See Water-
field, supra note 108, at 292. See also Scott A. Sinder, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
and State Regulation of the Business of Insurance - Past, Present and... Future?, 5
N.C. BANKING INST. 49 (2001) (discussing the operational complexities of the of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). Compare, once a developing country has a major insurer,
it may restrict the number of foreign telemedicine providers to protect its indigenous
physician labor market and fight the exodus of physician that is part of a "brain drain"
on the country.
245 Lipson, supra note 203, at 4.
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opening their insurance products in the market.246 The reason for this
seeming contradiction between the intent of the MFN and NT clauses
and insurance expansion under Mode 3 stems from the nature of
health insurance.247 More specifically, GATS allows WTO members
to exclude some foreign health insurers from their domestic markets
because of the need to establish a risk pool. To create a risk pool an
insurer must contemplate: (1) the proportion of the population from
whom premium collection is difficult (if not impossible), (2) the size
of the population that requires insurance, and (3) the mechanisms
available to control the costs per person. 48
Primarily because of the need to control the number of individuals
who will actually pay premiums into a risk pool, evidence exists that
more efficient pools are constructed when access to an insurance mar-
ket is limited.249 Absent a mechanism to limit the number of insurers
in a market, if the country operated a public health care service, the
country's treasury could be at risk. To illustrate this concept, consider
a hypothetical market with an abundance of health insurers. Some of
these insurers would find it advantageous to sell policies only to the
healthy individuals, thereby pushing the sicker patients onto the state-
sponsored insurance program. With many insurers in the market, it
might be difficult to detect which insurers were steering the poor-risk
patients to the pubic health service. Finally, exclusion of some foreign
insurers is desirable because it facilitates the development of a com-
prehensive insurance regulatory scheme, which, in turn, helps to
eliminate health insurance fraud and unfair competition.
250
Because market access is likely to be limited, competition for
Mode 3 health insurance expansion is likely to be fierce. This is espe-
cially true in developing countries. Insurers have known for years that
as wages and access to health care improve in developing countries,
these countries are increasingly ripe for health insurance growth.251 In
246 Id.
247 Id. at 5.
248 John A. Sbarbaro, Trade Liberalization in Health Insurance: Opportuni-
ties and Challenges: The Potential Impact of Introducing or Expanding the Availabil-
ity of Private Health Insurance within Low and Middle Income Countries 3 (Comm'n
on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper No. WG 4:6, Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paper6.pdf. See also Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005]
S.C.C. 35 (discussing the need to exclude foreign insurance companies to protect the
public health care system).
249 See Lipson, supra note 203, at 9; Chaoulli, 2005 S.C.C. 35.
250 Lipson, supra note 203, at 9.
251 Sbarbaro, supra note 248, at 2. See Mark Landler, Blaming the Foreign-
ers: Report to German Ruling Party Faults Private Investors, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2005, at C1 (observing that even Germany has been complaining of the expansion of
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fact, historically, a country's health insurance market's growth paral-
lels that country's economic growth. 2 Thus, for more than a decade
the World Bank's lending policies have been aimed at promoting the
development of private health insurance markets in developing coun-
tries, even if doing so is a detriment to a developing county's system
of public-funded health insurance.253
But, from the developing country's point of view, letting foreign
insurers into their country via Mode 3 raises other complex concerns.
While it is true that allowing private health insurance into a market
has an erosive effect on risk-pool formation,254 a mature private insur-
ance market tends to minimize the flight of domestically trained phy-
sicians to more advanced countries.255 That is, a mature health insur-
ance market helps a developing country fight the brain-drain of its
physician labor pool,256 while at the same time promoting the devel-
opment of two-tiered health systems in developing countries 257 that
may impair a developing country's effectiveness to treat communica-
ble diseases.2 58
d) Mode 4
Services supplied under Mode 4 are services that are related to the
movement of natural persons-not commercial operations-across
international trade borders. Although most commentators classify
telemedicine as a Mode 1 supplied service, this may only be true for
telemedicine provided under the Indian mode. When telemedicine is
provided under the nighthawk model, where U.S. physicians obtain
visas to stay in Australia or Spain, health care services are actually
U.S. financial institutions into its domestic market).
252 Sbarbaro, supra note 248, at 3.
253 Id. at 2.
254 Id. at 6.
255 Id. This problem is not necessarily limited to developing countries because
as the United States moves towards more first-dollar health care coverage with
Healthcare Savings Accounts, the United States will erode its own ability to develop
an adequate risk pool for medical insurance. See id. A detailed discussion of Health-
care Savings Accounts is beyond the scope of this article.
256 Although financial incentives heavily influence behavior, a detailed dis-
cussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article. But see STEVEN D. LEvITT &
STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 19-51 (2005) (discussing the unintended effects
of financial incentives).
257 Sbarbaro, supra note 248, at 6. There is data to indicate that the health
insurance markets in developing countries are maturing independent of the GATS.
See Lipson, supra note 203, at 5.
258 Sbarbaro, supra note 248, at 14 (speculating that introduction of private
health insurance in developing countries will erode the WHO's ability to treat com-
municable disease).
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provided by the movement of individual providers to remote foreign
locations.259
Mode 4 is the least utilized and least scrutinized mode for
expanding a market under GATS.26° Perhaps this is because Mode 4
services are extricably linked with immigration concerns,26' licensure,
and certification requirements.262 Accordingly, some commentators
have argued that Mode 4 commerce will only become an important
mode of commerce if, as a policy, WTO members adopt the lower
quality market's requirements. 63 Using the higher standard would be
undesirable because it would tacitly recognize a place for trade
barriers. This would certainly be an interesting standard for medical
licensure. But even if a "least qualified" rule were adopted for health
care services it would not necessarily reverse provider migration from
developing to developed countries, 264 a major concern of developing
countries.
265
E. Clauses Unique to NAFTA
Health services are a sensitive subject under NAFTA because of
the very different health care systems in the United States, Canada,
and Mexico.266 NAFTA brings discussion of this sensitive subject to
the forefront because it encourages cross-border mobility of health
professionals and consumers and "facilitate[s] mutual recognition of
qualifications and training among the countries. 26 7 Additionally,
NAFTA facilitates direct foreign investment in cross-border health
259 One could even argue that nighthawk radiology actually involves the es-
tablishment of a commercial presence in a remote country. Such an argument would
open the door for nighthawk telemedicine to be classified as a Mode 3 service.
260 Mutchnick et al., supra note 178.
261 Interestingly, not only do the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and
Australia have approximately the same density of physicians (roughly 250 per
100,000 population), all four countries have a similar percentage (25 percent) of
foreign physicians. See Fitzhugh Mullan, Quantifying the Brain Drain: International
Medical Graduates in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia
(Feb. 4, 2005), available at http://www.academyhealth.org/nhpc/foreignpolicy/
mullan.pdf (handout accompanying address at the AcademyHealth 2005 Health in
Foreign Policy Forum), This similar percentage of foreign medical providers suggests
that immigration laws play an important role in physician migration.
262 See Chanda, supra note 115, at 12.
263 See Michelle Sforza, Pub. Citizen, Trade Agreements & the Corporate
Takeover of US Healthcare (Apr. 2001), http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats/health/
articles.cfm?ID=6003.
264 See Chanda, supra note 115, at 9-12.
265 Chanda, supra note 60, at 22-23.
266 Id. at 70.
267 Id. at 71.
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* 268services. But to understand the importance of NAFTA to
telemedicine, it is necessary to examine NAFTA's unique clauses:
performance requirements, minimal standards, and investor-to-state
relationship.
1. Performance Requirements
Performance requirements "are government measures that oblige
investors to meet certain conditions, for example: to purchase locally;
transfer technology; or to achieve other local economic development,
environmental or social policy benefits. 269 Under NAFTA, member-
nations are prohibited from imposing performance requirements con-
nected "with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct or operation of an investment. .. In the health care arena,
perhaps the most important performance requirement that is prohib-
ited under NAFTA is a governmental mandate that goods and services
be purchased locally.27' Commentators have viewed this clause to
mean that state, provincial, and local governments may not prohibit
the payment for medical services simply because they are provided by
a remote practitioner.272 By freeing up payments for health care ser-
vices for foreign providers, NAFTA appears to be a green light for
member nations to use international telemedicine to earn a profit.
2. Minimal Standard Treatment
NAFTA's second unique clause concerns minimal standards.
Under NAFTA, a host country is to treat foreign investors from
member-nations "in accordance with international law, including fair
,,273
and equitable treatment and full protection and security. Yet, this
"seemingly innocuous obligation" has resulted in some unexpected
trade arbitration outcomes, as the minimal standard treatment clause
has been used to demonstrate that a NAFTA member failed to
promulgate regulations with sufficient transparency vis-d-vis foreign
268 "Up to 100 per cent foreign investment is permitted in hospitals and clin-
ics." Id. at 72.
269 GRIESHABER-O-rO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 32.
270 NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1106. This prohibition is further reinforced by
NAFTA's failure to exempt health care from the operation of the social services res-
ervations clause; which under limited circumstances, could allow for imposition of
performance requirements that are NAFTA inconsistent. See id. annex II.
271 GRIESHABER-OTro & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 32.
272 Id. 32-33. Under this view the United States could not limit foreign pro-
viders from receiving payment to for medical services, as is the current U.S. policy.
273 NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1105.
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investors.274 Thus, in actual operation, NAFTA's minimal standard
treatment clause allows foreign investors to insinuate that a member-
nation did not promulgate its trade policies fairly, thereby exposing
that country's trade policies to second-guessing by international trade
tribunals.2 75 For telemedicine, this NAFTA clause is a double-edged
sword: on one hand, it creates regulatory uncertainty thereby
inhibiting foreign investment, and on the other hand, it may ultimately
be a potent weapon to challenge the validity of state or provincial
licensure laws that are facially-neutral but functionally act to protect
the local medical community.
3. Investor-State Relations
The final clause unique to NAFTA concerns the investor-to-state
relationship.276 This clause is so unique, it is not found in any other
multilateral trade agreement.277 Under other multinational trade
agreements, including GATS, only member-nations can bring trade
disputes for arbitration 278 In such disputes, the complaining member-
nation bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that one of its
business organizations was harmed by the legislative action of another
member-nation.279 In contrast, NAFTA's investor-to-state relationship
clause grants investors in the economy of a foreign member-nation
with unprecedented rights, including: (1) member-nations are
prohibited from expropriating a foreign investor's property except for
a public purpose and only then after compensation,280 (2) aggrieved
investors have the right to bring a private action against a member
government, 281 and (3) because this clause is binding on the member-
nation treasury, if the arbitration tribunal finds the investor to be
282
aggrieved, this clause is enforceable against the member's treasury.
In fact, NAFTA's investor-to-state relationship clause is a major
reason that NAFTA critics have considered this treaty to be not so
274 GRIESHABER-OTrO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 33.
275 Id.
276 NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1110.
277 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 32-34.
278 World Trade Org. (WTO), GATS: Fact and Fiction: Misunderstandings
and Scare Stories: Is Dispute Settlement a Threat to Democracy?, http://www.wto.org
/english/tratop e/serv e/gats factfictionl2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
279 David Greising, Arming for Trade War: Boeing Sleuths Seek Proof of
Improper Subsidies to Airbus, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 2005, at C1.
280 NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 1110.
281 Id. atart. 1116.
282 Id. at art. 1135& 1136.
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much a trade agreement, but rather a "notorious" 283 investment
agreement.284
The importance of NAFTA's investor-state relationship clause for
telemedicine is best observed if NAFTA is distinguished from other
multilateral trade agreements. Traditionally, international trade trea-
ties provided private investors no rights at all.2 85 Moreover, even if an
aggrieved private investor enlists the help of his or her government in
a trade dispute, as two recent studies demonstrate, an aggrieved inves-
tor often goes uncompensated. In the first study, which examines the
enforceability of multilateral trade agreements, it was demonstrated
that an aggrieved countiy frequently can only obtain satisfaction in
trade tribunals if that country has sufficient economic leverage on
other members of a dispute to compel the offending country to live up
to its commitments.286 In the second study, which examined more than
three hundred WTO adjudicated trade disputes between 1995 and
2002, it was demonstrated that the WTO's arbitration dispute resolu-
tion system was: (1) biased in that the richer countries (United States
and European Union) made more extensive use of the tribunal system,
(2) damage calculations were problematic because of the multiple
trade related factors that needed to be considered, and (3) retaliatory
tariffs were ineffective because they distort allocations and are diffi-
cult to control such that small countries, who were uninvolved in the
original dispute, are the ones most harmed.287 In short, a telemedical
investor in a foreign economy under virtually all multilateral trade
agreements will likely go uncompensated if the forum country
changes its regulation, unless, of course, the investor is from the
United States or the European Union.
In contrast to other multilateral treaties that set up forums for
trade disputes, NAFTA's investor-state relationship clause gives the
foreign investor the right to sue the offending nation for damages.
While this makes it much easier for the foreign investor to recover
damages, the investor-state relationship clause also substantially un-
283 GRIESHABER-OTro & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 11.
284 Pub. Citizen, supra note 188.
285 See Cobb, supra note 174, at 49.
286 Chad P. Brown, On the Economic Success of GATT7 / WTO Dispute Set-
tlement, 86 REv. ECON. & STAT. 811, 811 (2004) (discussing the dispute settlement
features that assist governments to live up to their trade liberalization commitments).
287 Fritz Breuss, WTO Dispute Settlement in Action: An Economic Analysis of
four EU-US Mini Trade Wars, July 3-5, 2003, available at http://www.ecomod.net/
conferences/ecomod2003/ecomod2003_papers/Breuss.pdf (paper presented at the
International Conference on Policy Modeling (EcoMod2003), Istanbul).
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dermines the ability of federal, state, and provincial governments to
regulate their economies.
288
a) Methanex v. United States289
The Methanex case, for example, turned on the issue of whether a
state or province of a member-nation has the ability to enforce its own
290regulations concerning the general welfare of its citizens. In this
case, California, using its environmental protection code, ordered the
use of the gasoline additive methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE),
which is a neurotoxin, to be phased out of usage.29' Methanex, a major
Canadian refinery of MTBE, filed an arbitration action under
NAFTA's investor-state relationship clause against California, assert-
ing that its regulation impaired Methanex's investments in California
without a public purpose and that it was a violation of NAFTA's
minimal standard treatment clause.292
Ultimately, the United States prevailed in this action as the
arbitration panel ruled non-discriminatory environmental laws are in
the public interest; so there was no expropriation. More generally, the
years of Methanex litigation are likely to leave a residual chill in state
legislatures. No state is going to want its legislation tied up in
NAFTA-based litigation limbo for years. State legislatures will likely
now think twice about the impact of NAFTA on their regulator
schemes and proceed with caution when legislating new laws that
have significant economic impact. This includes licensure laws. For
telemedicine, this may mean that states will be less inclined to use
state licensure laws and mandated medical malpractice coverage as
trade barriers designed to keep foreign providers out of a local
market.
288 A review of trade dispute arbitrations brought under GATS did not iden-
tify any reports relevant to telemedicine. See WTO, Dispute Settlement: The Dis-
putes, Index of Disputes Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispu_
subjects index e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
H9 Met-hanex Corp. v. United States, at 2 (UNCITRAL Trib., Aug. 3, 2005)
(Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction & Merits), http://www.state.gov/s/l/
c5818.htm.
290 id.
291 id.
292 See generally GRIESHABER-OT'ro & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 33 (dis-
cussing the NAFTA minimal standards clause). Methanex asserted that California's
real motive in promulgating this environmental regulation was to reward Archer-
Daniels-Midland, which manufactured Gasohol, the compound that would replace
MTBE in California gasoline. Id. at 3-4.
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b) UPS v Canadian Post2 93
In another ongoing case, the U.S. trucking firm, United Postal
Service (UPS), filed a $200 million investor-state relationship action
against the Canadian postal service.294 At issue in this case is whether
the Canadian government can subsidize its postal service, thereby
making it harder for UPS to compete for business in Canada.295 At this
point, it would seem that UPS has a colorable cause of action against
the Canadian government as subsidizing the domestic postal service
appears inconsistent with NAFTA's MFN and NT clauses. Accord-
ingly, this case has important implications for the health care sector
because it may ultimately limit the degree that the U.S., Canadian, and
Mexican governments can subsidize domestic health care providers to
the detriment of foreign telemedical investors.296
c) Metalclad v. Mexico297
In a final case, Metalclad, a California corporation wanting to do
business in Mexico, filed suit under NAFTA's investor-state relation-
ship clause when it became frustrated with the Mexican licensure
process. 298 After Metalclad, a metal recycler, had secured all the nec-
essary Mexican national environmental protection licenses, the com-
pany was denied the necessary provincial environmental license
needed to build a plant in Mexico.299 In Metalclad's view, the action
of the local Mexican state frustrated its ability to do business in Mex-
ico without a valid public purpose.300 Accordingly, Metalclad filed an
investor-to-state relationship cause of action asserting it was damaged
because its time and investments in developing a Mexican subsidiary
were rendered worthless by the provincial government's failure to
293 UPS and Canada Post Embroiled in NAFTA Dispute, DIRECT, Jan. 25,
2005, htt://directmag.com/news/nafta-01-25-05/index.html.
94 Id.
295 Id.
296 This also may explain why the Centre for Minimal Access Surgery, a
Canadian remote telemedical provider, declined an opportunity to comment on gov-
ernment funding. McLean, supra note 1, at 246 n.219.
297 U.S. Dep't of State, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, http://
www.state.gov/s/l/c3752.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
298 Id.
299 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 16 ICSI) REVIEW-FoREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL (2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/mm-award-e.pdf (providing the English text of the award).
300 Id.
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grant a license. 30  A WTO arbitration panel agreed and awarded
Metalclad $16.7 million.30 2
Metalclad suggests that in the U.S. health care sector the various
state governments are not going to be able to frustrate foreign tele-
medicine providers from Canada and Mexico by making the licensure
process onerous in order to protect domestic providers. Moreover,
Metalclad also paves the way for European and Asian telemedical
providers to set up subsidiary operations in Mexico or Canada to gain
NAFTA investor-to-state relationship clause protection from onerous
state trade barriers designed to protect the U.S. health care market.
After all, there is nothing to prevent a telemedical signal sent from the
United States to Bangalore, India to be re-routed and sent to Cancun,
Mexico where the telemedicine provider may actually be located to
receive NAFTA protection.30 3
F. Epilogue: GATS, NAFTA and Telemedicine
The actual impact of GATS and NAFTA on international
telemedicine has yet to be decided. Still, some things seem clear.
Health care providers who are under financial stress30 4 are likely to
follow the insurance companies overseas in order to tap into new
revenue streams and cheaper labor pools. What remains to be seen is
whether such multilateral trade-in-health services will improve the
quality and affordability of health care in developing countries 30 5 and
whether the United States can protect its own provider market from
being offshored to low-wage providers. Where the balance point is set
for telemedicine services will, in turn, be influenced by multiple
factors such as immigration policies, GATS commitments, and
transaction costs. 3° 6 And transactions costs are not trivial concerns in
international trade because of (1) the complexity of these transactions,
(2) the use of poorly defined terms in the contracts that control these
transactions, and (3) the sometimes secretive collateral governmental
301 Id
302 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 297.
303 While a detailed discussion of how European or Asian-based corporations
could do business out of Canada or Mexico to trigger NAFTA's investor state-
relationship protection is beyond the scope of this article, the concept is intriguing.
304 Thomas R. McLean, Why Administrators Who Work in Glass Hospitals
Should Not Throw Stones, 2 AM. HEART Hosp. J. 109, 109-13 (2004).
305 See generally Hagopian et al., supra note 70.
306 As numerous factors will be involved in determining the balancing point
of physician migration, a detailed discussion of physician immigration is beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Blum, supra note 39 (discussing the impact of
access to digital technology on global health); and McLean, supra note 1.
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negotiations associated with international transactions that can
obscure the transparency of such transactions. 0 7 But assuming that
these legal details can be hammered out, the ethical considerations
associated with the trans-border delivery of health care will still
remain to be contemplated.3 °8
For the most part, however, these questions are solvable problems
if the economics are right. In fact, finding solutions to the legal,
logistic, and ethical aspects of international telemedicine would seem
to be a forgone conclusion when it is realized that: (1) capital
requirements to enter the market are minimal,30 9 (2) the telemedical
market is already being described in terms of multi-billion dollars,
310
and (3) providing health care services in developing countries is not
the equivalent to charity work.311 Rather, providing health care
services to developing countries is a big business. Given human
nature and the amount of money involved, it is not likely that
telemedicine will remain limited to a single country.
IV. THE FUTURE OF TELEMEDICINE
A. Views on Treaties
Accordingly, telemedicine is swiftly moving toward a fork in the
road: Will providers in the United States be able to protect their do-
mestic telemedicine markets or will the United States open its cyber-
borders to international telemedical providers to lower the cost of
health care and be able to provide health care to developing countries?
That is to say, what is the future of telemedicine? While some have
argued that the future holds an unlimited number of possibilities,
game theorists have demonstrated that not all futures are equally
probable.312 To the game theorist, what the future will bring is deter-
mined by our present decisions.313 In the U.S. telemedicine market,
the present decisions revolve around issues of how best to protect the
domestic market, and, to a lesser degree, allowing U.S. providers to
expand into markets overseas. So, to determine the extent to which
307 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 136-37.
308 Mutchnick et al., supra note 178.
309 See supra Part I.
310 WHO INDIA REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-65.
311 Mutchnick et al., supra note 178.
312 See generally MORTON D. DAVIs, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1983).
313 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1-2 (1994).
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other nations will allow the United States to have it both ways, it is
necessary to examine the present view of the world of telemedicine.
However, before examining these issues in detail, a word of cau-
tion is in order. While the offshoring of U.S. medical jobs will be
driven by the desire to tap into a low-wage labor pool to reduce the
cost of health care,3 14 the ability to tap into this pool will be tempered
by the patient safety movement, which seems to have a yin and yang
view of telemedicine. Some patient safety advocates want to see tele-
medicine play an increasing roll in the U.S. domestic telemedicine
market. For example, the IOM is promoting the use of disruptive
technologic innovations,315 including telemedicine,31 6 to facilitate the
delegation of medical services to physician extenders and to improve
access to care.317 On the other hand, concerns over patient safety have
led to work-time restrictions being placed on physicians in both the
European Union and, to a lesser extent, the United States. 31 8 Thus, to
the extent that shift-working-physicians become a workplace reality, it
would destroy one of the most significant reasons why medical ser-
vices are currently outsourced overseas. If physicians and/or physician
extenders working in shifts are able to cover the needs of the domestic
market for providers between 11:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M., the only
reason to outsource domestic medical services would be money. To
understand this observation, consider the rationalization of why medi-
cal services are outsourced to nighthawk and Indian providers: In
America, there is a lack of qualified well-rested physicians available
for consultation on the third shift (11:00 P.M.-7:00 A.M.). This cre-
ates a problem for hospitals wishing to maintain their accreditation
because hospitals are obligated to have radiographic images inter-
preted promptly and accurately as a condition of accreditation. 31 9 Ac-
314 A detailed discussion of why health care costs need to be controlled in the
United States is beyond the scope of this article. See generally McLean, supra note 1;
and McLean, supra note 106.
315 Christensen et al., supra note 38, at 104 (explaining why upstart compa-
nies employ disruptive innovations).
316 See INST. OF MED., supra note 45.
317 See generally INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW
HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001) (discussing the need to redesign the
American health care system).
318 Thomas R. McLean, The 80-Hour Work Week: Why Safer Patient Care
Will Mean More Health Care is Provided by Physician Extenders, 26 J. LEGAL MED.
339, 343, 350, 365 (2005).
319 See JCAHO, supra note 122, at LD 4.40 (concerning the need for hospitals
to ensure that an integrated patient safety system is in place and will respond in a
timely fashion to a patient's needs); 42 C.F.R. § 482.26 (2005) (concerning the need
for hospitals to have standard medical care available to patients on a twenty-
four/seven basis).
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cordingly, because hospitals are increasingly finding it difficult to
secure the services of radiologists on the third shift, hospitals have
increasingly looked overseas to secure radiology services. 320 But, if in
the United States, providers begin working in shifts, domestic provid-
ers would be available on the third shift so there would be no need to
contract with overseas providers for these services.
1. U.S. and E.U. Views on Trade in Services
In the late twentieth century international trade treaties changed
their character as they were increasingly designed less and less to pro-
tect domestic markets and labor pools. 321 In fact, in today's global
economy, international trade treaties have been designed with an eye
towards facilitating the offshoring of service jobs, including those in
health care; thereby turning the provision of services into a tradable
commodity.322 A common assumption of these trade agreements is
that labor is cheap,323 and this is the chief asset that third-world coun-
tries bring to the table.324 In return for this cheap labor, the United
States and the European Union plan to sell state-of-the-art medical
care to the developing countries, amongst other things.
Accordingly, it is of little surprise that multinational corporations
in the United States and the European Union increasingly want to use
the non-discrimination language of multilateral trade agreements as a
means to gain "market access" through forced deregulation and priva-
tization, especially at the state and provincial levels.325 For example,
the "progressive liberalization" and "successive rounds" clause of
GATS 326 is being used not only to eliminate certain labor rights, but
also to make it harder for any government to reverse the course of
320 Even if physicians worked in shifts, remote rural areas would probably
still be unable to obtain adequate local coverage for the third shift.
321 See generally Sforza, supra note 263.
322 See Ralph Nader, GATS, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CTR., Sept. 20, 2002,
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0920-05.htm. Cf Rebecca Buckman, Out-
sourcing with a Twist: Indian Phone Giant Bharti Sends Jobs to Western Firms in
Multinational Role Switch, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2005, at B 1 (providing that an Indian
telephone company outsourced its high-tech jobs to Germany, Sweden and Japan,
thereby demonstrating that outsourcing is not a West-to-East one-way street).
323 The concept that the government should help industries tap into cheap
labor markets dates from the earliest days of America. See RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 376 (2004).
324 Larry Jordan, Labor under Siege: Worker Pay Declines, CEOs Prosper:
As Inequity Widens, Employers Violate Labor Laws with Impunity, While Unions
Face Uphill Battle to Reclaim their Vital Role, MIDWEST TODAY, March 1998.
325 Nader, supra note 322.
326 GATS, supra note 11, art. XIX
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liberalization and return to a time when labor markets were pro-
tected.327 Given GATS' trade liberalizing framework and the eco-
nomic leverage of the United States and the European Union, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that the United States and the European
Union expect that developing countries will continue to make conces-
sions in the health care and insurance sectors.32 8 In short, global free-
trade is a concept that is not likely to be abandoned by the United
States or the European Union.
Thus, for the time being, multilateral trade agreements, like
GATS and NAFTA, will continue to be the polestar for developing
trade policies concerning services in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. Accordingly, it is to be expected that the United States
and the European Union will use the call for liberalization of trade
language under GATS and NAFTA as leverage to be applied to state
and provincial governments to tear down trade barriers. Conversely, if
the United States and the European Union were to attempt to protect
their lucrative medical markets with state licensure laws, these coun-
tries will potentially invite the imposition of costly trade sanctions,
and in the case of NAFTA, arbitration awards. Consequentially, if the
United States and the European Union want to stabilize their health
care costs by outsourcing certain medical services to low-wage off-
shoring,329 it seems unlikely that these countries will be able to allow
their state and/or provincial governments to dictate health and insur-
ance regulations much longer.
2. India
3 0
Moreover, in a world of global trade, it seems unlikely that less
economically developed countries will continue to allow the United
States and the European Union to expand into their health care market
without a reciprocal grant of access to the lucrative health care mar-
kets in the United States and Europe. Many developing countries, of
327 GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 8. With respect to
medicine, because many of the rights of providers are defined in state law, these
rights could vanish under GATS if not placed into federal law.
328 Lipson, supra note 203, at 6-7.
329 The need to control health care costs, however, is not limited to the United
States and the European Union. Even developing countries, which have spent as little
as 2.9-6.9 percent of their GDP on health care, are trying to cut health care costs to
make their health care systems more fiscally sustainable. See Jolita Butkeviciene et
al., Services Performance in Developing Countries: Elements of the Assessment 12
(WTO Symposium on Assessment of Trade in Services, March 14, 2002), http://
www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv e/sympmar02_unctad-e.doc.
330 See Chanda, supra note 60, at 41-49.
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which India is perhaps the best example, view the health care markets
in developed nations as potential revenue streams that can be used to
grow their own economies. After all, it is estimated that the global
demand for e-health services is $1.25 trillion and most of that revenue
is, at present, flowing out of developed countries. 331 Moreover, be-
332
cause of the absence of reliable data for this market, many com-
mentators believe this figure for the size of the e-health market to be
conservative. 333 Accordingly, even if a developing country can only
secure a small piece of the commerce in e-health with a modest in-
vestment in a VPN and some telemedical software, that developing
country could be substantially enriched. And if a developing country
can use telemedicine to tap into the revenue streams associated with
the health care markets in the developed countries, the developing
countries stand to increase their overall prosperity because of better
employment.334 Such a lure of prosperity is likely to be irresistible by
the developing world.
In fact, perhaps no other country stands to gain as much from
global telemedicine as India. With its large contingent of English-
speaking people and a solid engineering infrastructure, India is poised
to move into the telemedicine marketplace in a substantial way.
With its foot already in the U.S. domestic health care market, India
telemedicine providers are likely to continue to gain market share in
the United States because their business model is the most cost-
competitive.336 A recent position paper completed for the Indian gov-
ernment, moreover, suggests that India has no interest in providing
telemedical services under the more cost-efficient nighthawk
model.337 As Indian companies and providers increasingly gain market
share in the developed world's health care marketplace, countries like
the United States and the European Union will increasingly have to
rethink their schemes for health care delivery systems and the means
of protecting their health care markets.
31 Id. at 5-6.
332 Id. at 12.
333 Id. at 13. See Yeo, supra note 60 (stating that although there are no reliable
figures of health services exports, the United States is almost certainly the largest
exporter).
334 Butkeviciene et al., supra note 329, at 12.
335 See Chanda, supra note 115, at 48.
336 See supra Part I.B. & C.
337 Cf Chanda, supra note 60, at 44-49 (nothing in Ms. Chanda's working
paper suggests that Indian providers wish to compete on anything other than price,
therefore, an inference may be drawn that Indian providers are not willing to use the
nighthawk model).
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3. Canada338
The potential impact of remote providers invading a domestic
health care market appears to most acute in Canada. 339 With its health
care system under financial strain,340 Canada, of late, seems yearly to
undertake a comprehensive review of its health care sector, including
telemedicine. 341 In addition, the two most recent Canadian studies on
their health delivery systems have contemplated the impact of multi-
lateral trade-in-services agreements on the Canadian health care sys-
tem. In the Romanow report, however, the Canadians only peripher-
ally dealt with the issues of GATS and NAFTA.342 Yet, in releasing
Bad Medicine the following year, the Canadians became the first
country to systematically analyze the potential impact of multilateral
trade agreements on its domestic health care market. This report
leaves little doubt, absent substantial amendments, that the Canadians
view GATS and NAFTA as a significant challenge for any country
wishing to develop its own comprehensive national health care policy
in a global environment.343
B. National Licensure
National licensure is an idea whose time has come. The existing
state and provincial licensure system creates a regulatory matrix that
inhibits countries, like the United States, from adopting the uniform
best-practices of medicine.344 Adoption of a national licensure system,
338 See generally GRIESHABER-OTro & SINCLAIR, supra note 171 (discussing
the debate over the future of telemedicine in Canada).
339 Blum, supra note 39.
340 Id.
341 See, e.g., GRIESHABER-OTTO & SINCLAIR, supra note 171.
342 See generally GRIESHABER-OT-ro & SINCLAIR, supra note 171, at 69-90
(providing an overview of the Romanow Report).
34f Id. at 99. Bad Medicine's focus is unique amongst publications that con-
template the impact of multilateral trade agreements on health care. Most other re-
ports on this subject take a macroeconomic view, i.e., they contemplate the impact of
multilateral trade agreements on the entire health care sector. Bad Medicine, in con-
trast, which examines the impact of GATS and NAFTA on individual transactions,
has a more microeconomic flavor. For example, Bad Medicine observes that GATS
and NAFTA have the distinct possibility of frustrating the Canadian government's
planned reforms of its public-sector health insurance monopoly, especially with re-
spect to who regulates the services that can be provided and on what terms. Id. at 21.
But the bottom line of Bad Medicine is straight forward: compliance with multilateral
trade agreements spells the end of provincial (or state) licensure of medicine and the
regulation of insurance.
344 INST. OF MED., LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE: COORDINATING GOVERNMENT
ROLES IN IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALiTY 82 (2002) (stating that state licensure
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something that is advocated by the IOM,345 would also facilitate an-
other goal of the patient safety movement: the increased use of tele-
medicine in the domestic health care marketplace 346 because, like a
national pilots' licensure system, a national medical license simplifies
transactions and standardizes expectations.347
Yet, for America, a perceived downside of a national medical li-
censure system is that it will facilitate the influx of low-wage foreign
telemedicine providers into the U.S. health care market, thereby
stimulating competition for services, and ultimately allowing the for-
eign providers to take the jobs of domestic providers. Because a na-
tional medical licensure system would eliminate state-law based trade
barriers, this is a legitimate concern; for just as with pilots, a national
license opened the country such that licensed foreign pilots can land
anywhere in America, so too will a national medical license allow
foreign providers access to treat patients anywhere in the United
States.34 8 Further, because existing multilateral trade treaties dictate
that any national licensure acts must be the least restrictive to protect
the country's legitimate interests,349 a national medical license could
not be a substitute for state-law based trade barriers, as a protective
trade barrier for providers, as was done in the past by Australia.35 °
But while American providers may yearn for the protective mar-
kets of yesterday, in the field of health care the United States is al-
ready falling behind the rest of the world on national and international
licensure. For example, because New Zealand considers physicians
from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada to have equivalent
training, physicians from these countries may automatically work in
New Zealand if they have an unrestricted license in their home coun-
creates a floor for medical quality, not a definition for best practice); INST. OF MED.,
supra note 48, at 135-51 (discussing the heterogeneous practices that arise from a
system of state medical licensure).
345 See INST. OF MED., supra note 48.
346 See INST. OF MED., supra note 45, at 8.
347 A detailed discussion of national pilot licensure is beyond the scope of this
article, but see supra note 120.
348 See Fed. Aviation Admin., Flight Standards Service: How Do I Become a
Pilot: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), http://www.faa.gov/AVR/afs/pilotfaq.htm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006); Ross Oliver, How to Become an Airline Pilot,
http://www.airaffair.com/Library/start-airplanes.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006);
SoYouWanna Get a Pilot's License, http://www.soyouwanna.corn/site/syws/pilot/
pilot.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
349 See supra Part III.C.
350 See Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n, ACCC Proposes
Surgical College Reform to Help Address Surgeons Shortage (Feb. 6, 2003), http://
www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemld/88308.
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try.351 So if America wants to be a member of a global trading com-
munity, how much longer will it be able to retain its system of state
medical licensure, which acts as a domestic trade barrier that protects
its domestic health care market?
C. A National Medical Malpractice Market?
A final comment on medical malpractice coverage is needed.
Once a national medical licensure system is in place, the need for fifty
independent medical malpractice markets, regulated by states, will
seem like an antiquated idea. A national malpractice system, 352 like a
national licensure system, would be reasonably expected to decrease
the cost of health care transactions.353 In fact, the elimination of
transaction costs associated with health and pension plans was a
significant reason behind the enactment of ERISA.354 To minimize
transaction costs for the health and pension plans, Congress
preempted all state-law related to ERISA plans.3" Moreover, absent a
uniform system of medical malpractice coverage, the IOM's
recommendation that telemedicine be increasingly utilized could be
stymied if providers had to add in the costs of compliance with
multiple state malpractice codes. So, perhaps Congress should create a
national medical malpractice act that preempts all state-related law
concerning medical misadventures.
356
But any shift to a national medical malpractice coverage system
must also contemplate the impact of multilateral trade agreements.
Given that the U.S. insurers benefit from market expansion under
Mode 3, it is unlikely the rest of the world will look favorably on any
attempt by the United States to consolidate its medical malpractice
market under the cachet of an indispensable government service.
357
351 Med. Counsel of N.Z., Policy on Registration in New Zealand (May
2004), http://www.mcnz.org.nz/Default.aspx?tabid=983.
352 This discussion is not to suggest that there will be a single malpractice
provider for the entire nation. That is unlikely because large health care provider
organizations often find self-insurance through a wholly owned subsidiary to be cost-
effective. See Rosemary M. McAndrew, Captives: Here to Stay, Bus. F. ONLINE
(2003), http://www.businessforum.com/RMM_01.html. Known as captive insurance
companies, this form of insurance may become more popular as the health care mar-
ket consolidates. However, a detailed discussion of captive insurers is beyond the
scope of this article.
353 See INST. OF MED., supra note 48.
354 See Richards & McLean, supra note 99, at 461.
3" 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2005).
356 Such a law is not that far fetched. See HEALTH Act of 2005, S. 354,
109th Cong. § 11 (b) (2005) (enacted).
357 See GATS, supra note 11, art. 1.3.
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But, as we have seen, allowing foreign medical malpractice carriers
into a U.S. domestic market could disrupt the construct of appropriate
medical malpractice risk pools. So who is going to be excluded from
the market and on what ground(s)? Because the devil is in the details,
while medical malpractice market consolidation may offer certain
economic efficiencies, in a world of global trade, perhaps it is not the
ideal paradigm.
For international telemedicine, an interesting malpractice
coverage paradigm shift-and one that would avoid insurance pool
construction problems-would be to provide medical malpractice
coverage in a fashion analogous to maritime shipping insurance.
While this article is not intended to be a primer on maritime
insurance, the basic principle of underwriting of maritime insurance
coverage is to predicate that coverage on an individual ship's
seaworthiness and an individual's experience.35 8 Thus, as envisioned
here, international telemedical operations could be insured based on
the individual "medical" worthiness of telemedical system-based on
its hardware, software and security-, and the patient safety track
record of the system's owners. Finally, if a maritime-like insurance
coverage system were adopted for international telemedicine, it would
have aesthetic appeal if jurisdiction in telemedicine was determined
by the nationality of the provider in a manner analogous to the law of
the sea.359
D. Medical Sweat Shops?
Lurking in the back of this article is the notion that multilateral
trade agreements will ultimately impact the health care market, both
in the United States and abroad. Implicit in this notion is the
assumption that multilateral trade-in-services agreements will
continue to be the guide posts to global commerce. But is this
assumption well-grounded? Certainly, this assumption can potentially
be overturned as borderless e-commerce-in-services conducted under
multilateral trade-in-services agreements may become stymied at
several points by the self interests of a handful of nations.36 ° Still, as
long as the United States encourages free trade,6 this assumption will
358 See generally Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Labarca, 260 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir.
2001).
359 See supra Part II.B.4.
360 Kristi L. Bergemann, Comment, A Digital Free Trade Zone and Necessar-
ily-Regulated Self-Governance for Electronic Commerce: The World Trade Organi-
zation, International Law, and Classical Liberalism in Cyberspace, 20 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 595, 601 (2002).
361 The United States will continue to encourage free trade by promoting
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remain valid. Moreover, because of the sheer volume of commerce
that can be conducted under multilateral trade-in-services agreements,
some commentators have observed that global trade tends to diminish
the volatility in the stock market 362 and can be used as a vehicle for
the expansion of corporate America overseas.363 Given these
additional beneficial effects of multilateral trade agreements, the
assumption that they will continue to be guides of U.S. policies for
globalization seems secure.
Accordingly, America's health care market is going to need to
grow increasingly comfortable with the principles of multilateral trade
agreements. This in turn means that America must grow comfortable
with the offshoring of health care jobs to low-wage Indian telemedical
providers as a method to control rising health care costs. After all, this
is the same cost-cutting strategy corporate America employed to con-
trol rising blue-collar labor costs in the 1970s and rising white-collar
labor costs in the 1990s.364 And just as offshore manufacturing sweat-
shops began in the late 1970s, and call center style sweatshops began
to appear in the late 1990s, the stage appears to be set to offshore
"medical sweat shops."
"Sweatshop," a term that originated more than 150 years ago, is a
form of labor abuse "in which workers are employed for long hours at
low wages and under unhealthy conditions. 365 If we offshore suffi-
cient medical jobs to India, it seems likely for several reasons that
Indian telemedical providers may organize their physician labor force
into sweatshop-style operations. First, working and living conditions
in India are far below the conditions that U.S. workers take for
granted,366 and while wages have improved modestly in recent years,
367Indian physicians yearn for improved reimbursement. How poorly
physicians are paid in India is difficult to calculate because accurate
estimates of the number of hours worked by physicians in India are
not available.368 Yet, because Indian society seems to have even less
debate and recommending that WTO member countries continue the common prac-
tice of not imposing customs duties on imported electronic transmissions. Id. at 603.
362 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 118-19 (2d ed. 2005).363 See supra Part III.
364 McLean, supra note 1, at 205-06.
365 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1176 (1973).
366 See Srobona Roy Choudhury, A Struggle in Bangalore, FRONTLINE, Mar.
2-15, 2002, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1905/19050380.htm.
367 Yash Lokhandwala, Doctors on Strike: A Legitimate Last Option, 2
INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS (2005), available at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/
131ed002.html.
368 Indian institutional telemedical providers are prepared to provide service
on a twenty-four/seven basis. See AHF Reaches Out to Remote Areas through Tele-
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respect for its physicians than American society, 369 it is probably fair
to say that Indian physicians are not only paid substantially less, but
they must work under far less ideal conditions than their American
counterparts. Second, India as a nation very much wants to enter the
U.S. health care market so that it can tap into the telemedical revenue
"river." After all, India views its present share of the U.S. health care
market as just being the "tip of the [e-health] ice-burg [sic]." 3 70 Ac-
cordingly, given its low-wage physician labor pool and the potential
monetary awards for the country as a whole, it is not hard to imagine a
room somewhere in India where a number of Indian physicians are
positioned in front of telemedicine monitors working just as a call
center would work, i.e., a sweatshop.
CONCLUSION
Today, developed countries, like the United States, are looking to
export their financial institutions and simultaneously reduce the cost
of their health care systems. To the extent that a developed country
can protect its domestic markets at home with trade barriers, so much
the better. Unfortunately, such goals are more or less mutually exclu-
sive, and something has to give. For the United States, the likely quid
pro quo for allowing its financial institutions to expand into develop-
ing countries will be that the United States is going to have to open its
health care markets to low-wage providers in developing countries.
Thus, as we progress through the twenty-first century, America is
likely to increasingly purchase more of its routine health care services
from remote cost-effective providers over the Internet via relatively
cheap VPNs and related software. Possibly, these telemedicine opera-
tions will have the look and feel of today's offshore call centers be-
cause of the competition amongst developing countries to gain a lar-
ger share of the U.S. health care market.
Such an outlook is not a surprise to many of the major medical
organizations, like the ACR. These organizations are currently seeing
many of the jobs of their constituents moving overseas just as blue-
collar jobs were outsourced a generation ago. Accordingly, many
medical organizations want to erect trade barriers in the form of state
licensure laws and malpractice coverage requirements to protect do-
cardiology, EXPRESS HEALTHCARE MGMT., June 1-15, 2004, http://www.express
healthcaremgmt.com/20040615/technology01 .shtml.
369 Jyoti Taskar, Doctors Under Siege, 2 INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS (2005), avail-
able at http://www.issuesimnedicalethics.org/l14cvl09.html (discussing how Indian
physicians are frequently victims of patient assaults).
370 WHO INDIA REPORT, supra note 2, at 63.
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mestic providers from foreign competition. To the extent that these
trade barriers temporarily shield domestic providers from competi-
tions while a more durable long-term solution is worked out, trade
barriers are a good idea.371 On the other hand, if medical organizations
believe that trade barriers can shield their constituents from competi-
tion indefinitely, these beliefs are misplaced.
In literature, Dr. Faust hoped that the devil would not return to
collect on a debt, but the devil did return. Similarly, while U.S. physi-
cians and hospitals can hope that remote low-wage providers can be
placed at bay with trade barriers, remote providers armed with cheap
telecommunication devices and multilateral trade agreements will
ultimately break down the trade barriers that now keep them out of the
U.S. health care market. And while there are several collateral reasons
why trade barriers will not protect the medical profession for much
longer,372 the primary reason is that the growth of the U.S. economy is
dependant on global expansion under the banner for free trade. Ac-
cordingly, U.S. economic policy needs to comply with the dictates of
the multilateral free trade agreements, like GATS and NAFTA. Yet,
these agreements call for the progressive removal of trade barriers so
as to promote two-way trade-in-services between developed and de-
veloping countries. Thus, absent a de-emphasis on global free trade or
a substantial change in America's health care system, such as physi-
cians working in shifts, it seems likely that America's ability to pro-
tect the livelihood of its medical providers with trade barriers is lim-
ited. The bottom line is that if American providers want to avoid the
fate of Dr. Faust, to retain their jobs, American providers, paradoxi-
cally, should invest in a strategy of evermore efficient and sophisti-
cated telemedicine so as to keep the technologic barrier to telemedi-
cine high.373
371 McLean, supra note 1, at 263-64. For example, the United States could
work to raise the technologic barrier to enter the telemedical market or, alternatively,
the United States could work towards lowering the costs associated with providing
medical services. Id.
372 For example, the patient safety movement's push for national licensure is
based on factors that are independent of international trade-in-services.
373 See COASE, supra note 63.
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